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Abstract 
Promoting good governance has, since the 1990s, been a central component towards envisaging 
development assistance. However, good governance contemporarily configures in the security 
domain as well, which can be attributed to the current foreign political emphasis of combining 
civil-military efforts and the notion that development and security are intertwined. Using the 
Copenhagen School‟s Securitization Framework and aspects of Thierry Balzacq‟s and Rita 
Floyd‟s “sociological approach” to securitization, this thesis charts discursively and non-
discursively good governance‟s transition into the security domain. On the basis of considering 
power, context and practice towards securitization, it is demonstrated that good governance has 
successfully been securitized.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Problem Area 
Spearheaded by the World Bank in the late 1980s, good governance emerged as an institutional 
economic development agenda. Yet, by the 1990s it had transpired into a value-based agenda, 
where the international donor community coupled its promotion with conditions of 
democratization and human rights (Kjær, 2004). Accordingly, the agenda became synonymous 
with a wide array of qualities associated with Western ideals concerning state configuration 
(Grindle, 2016: 1). Despite the Western bias that epitomizes the agenda; good governance 
nevertheless seems like a good idea. It is difficult to argue against the premise that citizens in the 
Global South would be better off if public life was conducted by democratic institutions that are 
fair, transparent, accountable, participatory, and efficient. As noted by Grindle (2010: 1), ―who, 
after all, can reasonably defend bad governance?‖ 
Ironically, currently it appears that the Global North finds it necessary to defend itself against 
bad governance in the Global South. This is tied to an altered threat perception in the post-9/11 
world; where state strength had characterized security concerns during the Cold War, currently 
the weakness of states has emerged as a security priority for Western policy makers (Holsti, 
1996). As noted by the Bush administrations‘ National Security Strategy of September 2002, 
―America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones‖ (US DOD, 
2002). This conviction stems from the observation that transnational terrorism, which has a 
concrete bearing on the well-being of citizens in the West, is fostered by state fragility (Patrick, 
2006: 27). Bad governance, in the form of an inability to provide basic goods for society, 
undermines the authority of fragile states, in turn creating the basis for the potential development 
of hotbeds for terrorism (Rotberg, 2003).  
To this end, the West has become aware of development assistance‘s value as a means of 
addressing root-causes of state failure, asserted through the impression that development and 
security are interlinked (Buur et al, 2007: 9). The security-development nexus builds on the 
notion that the malaise of development, poverty, and weak state capacity are sources of 
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insecurity in the Global South (Duffield, 2001). It is argued in this respect, that conflicts in the 
developing world are driven by domestic factors of political instability and deficiencies in 
development, which pose a regional threat and influence the security in the Global North 
(Williams, 2008).  
Moreover, since the early stages of the war in Afghanistan, it became increasingly common to 
hear politicians speak of development and security as a joint task. Per Stig Møller, former Danish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in this regard that, ―development assistance is an integrated 
part of the Danish foreign security policy‖ (Møller, 2003). A number of policies have since been 
issued in accordance to this statement, accentuating the importance of civil-military cooperation 
and the merging of security and development efforts towards a common objective of peace and 
prosperity (MFA, 2010; MFA, 2013). Comprehensive approach strategies 
(samtænkningsstrategier) are a testament to this ―new‖ political priority. They build on the 
premise that an integrated development of strategies, coordination, implementation and 
evaluation across ministries, enables the West to build stable nations and achieve lasting 
democratic peace (Jakobsen, 2014). By this token, the notion of development and security being 
interlinked has been further enforced by civil and military efforts being contemporarily 
combined.  
Based on these aspects, it could argued that development is being tasked with the responsibility 
of ensuring safety, security and peace, in supplement to its traditional objectives of socio-
economic growth, poverty alleviation, and promoting democratic liberal values. This new role 
has led to scholars to note that a securitization of development has occurred. 
In essence, Securitization Theory ‗‗involves an investigation into the ways in which issues, 
processes and events become seen as matters of security‘‘ (Williams, 2008: 3). Introduced in the 
1990s by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, the securitization framework was 
instrumental for broadening the conceptualization of security itself. The nature of conflicts and 
security concerns in the post-Cold War era brought to question, whether the strict adherence and 
focus on state-survival within security studies, was sufficient for explaining what security 
entailed. This expansion of sectors that could be connected to security, gave leeway to the 
interpretation, that security and development were interlinked (Rothstein, 1986), forming the 
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basis for the argument that development had been securitized.   
While the securitization of development is commonly accepted amongst scholars within security 
studies and international development studies (Fisher & Anderson, 2015), investigating the 
components of development assistance, which have been subject to securitization, has gone 
relatively unnoticed. This is witnessed in a gap in the literature regarding the securitization of 
good governance. An examination of this research topic is warranted due to the securitization of 
development assistance broadly speaking, as well as considering how bad governance is 
perceived to be at the crux of state fragility. Moreover, there are several signs that good 
governance configures in a security setting, which is seen in good governance being listed as a 
measure in policy papers concerning fragile states (MFA, 2010: 17), comprehensive approach 
strategies (MFA, 2013: 17-19), and security sector reforms in Afghanistan (MFA, 2008: 17-22). 
I propose the following problem formulation in accordance to the problem area outlined above.  
1.2 Problem Formulation 
How has the good governance agenda been linked to security and has good governance been 
securitized? Moreover, if such a securitization can be confirmed, how has it taken place 
discursively and in practice? 
The global dimensions of this problem will be addressed by examining good governance‘s usage 
and role in a Danish foreign political context. As I will highlight throughout this thesis, the way 
Denmark has been applying good governance lends itself to how other major global players 
operate with the term. The specific case of Denmark‘s good governance agenda serves as a 
gateway to understand: 1) securitization at the theoretical level, and; 2) the broadened objectives 
and new roles of security and development in the 21
st
 century, which hence concern the abstract 
and general levels of researching. I will in greater detail discuss the global aspect of Denmark as 
a case in Section 2.4. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure & Working Questions 
This thesis is broken down into two overarching parts, which each consist of three chapters.  
1.3.1 Part One: Methodology, Theory and Context 
Part one consists of an introduction to the methodology used for this research, the theoretical 
tools, and the context of good governance‘s origins within development assistance. 
In Chapter 2 I discuss this thesis‘ methodological considerations, highlighting my choice in 
theory and giving an overview of my empirical sources. It also discusses the selections and 
exclusions I have made and underlines the limitations to my research method.  
In Chapter 3 I address the working question: how can Securitization Theory be used to analyze 
the transition of good governance into the security domain and what are the limitations of the 
theory in this regard? This chapter thus elaborates upon the key aspects of the Copenhagen 
School‘s securitization framework, and how I intend to apply it in relation to this research area. 
In addressing the theory‘s limitations, additional views on securitization, provided by Floyd 
(2015) and Balcazq (2005) will be adopted.  
In Chapter 4 I will be exploring: how has good governance been construed within the 
development assistance scene, and to this end, what has been the Danish prioritization regarding 
this field? This chapter provides the foundation to understanding how good governance 
configures within development assistance, whilst highlighting how Denmark has applied this 
notion. 
1.3.2 Part Two: Analysis and Discussion 
Part two concerns my securitization analysis of good governance, which is done by examining 
both discursive and non-discursive elements. This lastly will enable me to discuss the potential 
successful securitization of good governance.  
In Chapter 5 I will be addressing the working question: what has discursively been represented 
as a threat, by Danish securitizing actors, and what are the possible links to good governance? 
This chapter examines speech acts presented by Danish Ministers, which concern development 
and good governance in relation to security concerns. I will demonstrate that terrorism is the 
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exalted existential threat presented by these securitizing actors, but over time underdevelopment 
and fragile states emerged as a threat. 
In Chapter 6 I will explore, in a Danish context, how has good governance from a non-
discursive perspective been enlisted in the security domain? This chapter is devoted to 
examining non-discursively the construction of security. This is done primarily by looking at the 
policy arena, which demonstrates more explicitly, how good governance has been enlisted in the 
security domain in accordance to the threat identified in Chapter 5. I will demonstrate that good 
governance‘s enlistment in the security domain can be shown in three manners: 1) the narrow 
conception and the fragile state agenda, 2) the broad conception, primarily linked to the 
engagement in Afghanistan, and 3) the notion‘s role in a military context. 
In Chapter 7 I will explore, if good governance has been successfully securitized in a Danish 
context? To this end, I will be looking at extraordinary measures and the audience‘s accept, 
which according to Emmers (2013) unveils a successful securitization. This chapter serves as a 
concluding discussion of the analysis, supplementing my assessment of good governance 
securitization with the views of Floyd (2015) and Balzacq (2005).  Lastly, in my conclusion I 
revert to my problem formulation and the global scale of this research topic. 
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Part One   
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodological considerations of this thesis. It serves to justify my 
approach of using Denmark‘s good governance agenda as a case, whilst indicating some of the 
limitations that are inherent to my research method. In this chapter I will discuss my choice of 
theory, highlight the sources I used to conduct my research, and touch upon my research 
strategy.  
2.2 Choice of Theory 
The theoretical framework chosen for this thesis is the Copenhagen School‘s Securitization 
Theory. From a philosophy of science standpoint, the securitization framework is often referred 
to as a social constructivist approach because it emphasizes how discourses can bring about 
security concerns. Securitization Theory entails the uncovering of how certain issues -which 
might not have traditionally been associated with security - are able to become matters of 
international security, thereby becoming ‗real‘ concerns. The real effects of security concerns 
thus not only reside as social constructs, but also have objective implications; hence the 
Copenhagen School‘s securitization framework can also be construed from a realist perspective. 
For a more detailed account regarding this paper‘s philosophy of science see: Appendix A. 
The Copenhagen School‘s framework aligns with the interests of this paper, namely to uncover 
whether good governance as a politicized issue has transitioned into the security domain. 
However, this framework does have limitations, particularly when it comes to the question of the 
successful securitization of a subject.  
Several scholars have debated the Copenhagen School‘s approach because it relies heavily on 
extraordinary measures and the audience‘s accept to indicate the successful securitization 
without clearly stipulating how measures and accept are identified. This critique has been made 
due to the fact that successful securitization is contingent on arbitrary and subjective conclusions 
from the analyzer. The theoretical deficits inherent to this approach will be elaborated upon in 
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Section 3.4.3; for now it is just important to introduce in which manner I will be adopting 
supplementary views of securitization. 
Firstly, it is not always clearly presented via speech acts, how good governance configures in the 
security domain; it is typically articulated in extension to several other facets (e.g. terrorism, 
underdevelopment and state fragility). Therefore, as a supplement to speech acts, I will also 
examine non-discursive factors that unveil the semantics behind good governance‘s enlistment in 
the security domain. This will be done through the use of Danish foreign policy papers. My 
examination of non-discursive elements lends itself to how Emmers (2010) and McDonald 
(2008) construe a successful securitization also based on material in the form of policy papers, 
images, and bureaucratic practices.  
When it comes to extraordinary measures, it is typically difficult to identify them along the lines 
of exceptional characteristics, since liberal democracies seldom adopt exceptional measures 
when dealing with a threat (Floyd, 2015: 5). Floyd argues that measures should instead be 
determined by what security practitioners (e.g. policy formulators in the form of civil servants) 
identify as being appropriate measures in dealing with a threat (ibid: 3). To this end, the policy 
papers will serve as indicators of what measures the security practitioners saw necessary to 
deploy in dealing with the threats of terrorism, underdevelopment and fragile states.  
Lastly, when examining the audience‘s accept I will consider the importance of context 
(Balzacq, 2005). In doing so, I will demonstrate that good governance‘s ―contextual value‖ has 
played a vital role in terms of legitimizing the discourse.  
  
9 
 
2.3 Choice of Sources 
This thesis consists of both primary and secondary data that have been collected from a range of 
sources, including: policy papers, legislation, interviews, speeches, books, journal articles and 
website articles.  
2.3.1 Primary Sources 
2.3.1.1 Speeches 
Due to securitization theory‘s roots in constructivism and the framework‘s emphasis on 
discourses, I relied on qualitative sources for this thesis. As Balczacq (2011: 39) notes, 
―discourse analysis helps students to map the emergence and evolution of patterns of 
representations which are constitutive of a threat‖. Much of my primary data was obtained by 
conducting discourse analyses of speeches enabling me to identify patterns in relation to the 
threat. 
As noted by Emmers (2013: 134) ―securitization tends to be a process dominated by powerful 
actors that benefit from privileged positions‖. This has been the case for the speech acts used for 
this paper, as I primarily identified Danish ministers that made remarks regarding this research 
area. I have relied on various speeches, parliamentary inquiries and op-eds presented by Danish 
ministers, ranging from 2001 to present. When selecting these speeches, the criteria applied was 
that the topic of the speech act had to relate to security directly or indirectly; hence speeches, 
which exclusively dealt with development assistance, were not selected. It is important to note 
that good governance was seldom articulated directly in relation to threats. Typically, its 
articulation was in extension or in correlation to broader security concerns, which in the 
immediate post-9/11 period was terrorism, though the discourse transitioned towards 
underdevelopment and fragile states later on. Some of the speeches found were in English while 
others were translated from Danish to English.     
2.3.1.2 Interviews 
Some of my primary data was obtained through interviewing individuals that currently are or 
previously were employed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Defense. A total of seven interviews were conducted primarily with civil servants/government 
officials that are advisers to good governance work. I selected such interviewees due to their 
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relevance in accordance to Floyd‘s position on security practitioners determining the appropriate 
measures.  
However, it should be noted that the information obtained from these interviews represents 
certain views. Firstly, it is likely that these individuals are embedded with an institutional culture 
from the ministries, and thus also adhere and support the political views, areas of prioritization, 
and norms of the ministries. Therefore, different views regarding Danish foreign policy would 
have been retrieved if interviews were conducted with individuals at higher or lower levels (e.g. 
a Permanent Secretary might have had a deeper understanding of Danish strategies).  
Four of my interviewees were affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and primarily had 
worked with good governance in relation to development assistance; typically with good 
governance program reviews and appraisals. Two interviewees from the Danish Ministry of 
Defense had worked as Chief Governance Planners (2010) in Afghanistan for ISAF. One of them 
wished to remain anonymous and will hereon simply be referred to as ―anonymous‖. A list of the 
interviewees can be found in Appendix B. 
The interviewees affiliated with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were seminal in 
providing me with an understanding of what good governance meant from a Danish 
developmental context. The two interviews with the Chief Governance Planners were the most 
useful in that they could concretely reflect on how good governance was implemented in 
Afghanistan and also highlighted the concepts‘ significance in a military context.  
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, which allowed me to use probing 
questions that were not previously formulated in my interview guide. It should be noted that I 
have translated these interviews into English from Danish. The interviews are available upon 
request at: thomaskieler@hotmail.com.    
2.3.2 Secondary Sources 
Given that my research area covers good governance in relation to security and development, I 
have also relied on an array of books and articles. The conceptual and academic discussions, 
which underpin my interpretation of 1) governance, 2) the security-development nexus 3) fragile 
states, and 4) COIN, can be found in Appendices D, E, F and G. The underpinnings of these 
respective issues serve as gateways to understanding how Danish foreign policy formulation has 
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been influenced by the academic scene. However, I chose to place these sections in the appendix, 
so as not to interrupt the flow of my analysis. 
2.3.2.1 Books 
Several books were used to gain an understanding of good governance from a development 
assistance perspective. Firstly, Anne Mette Kjær‘s Governance (2004), and Guy Peters‘ 
Institutional Theory in Political Science (1999) were used as main sources for the examination of 
governance as a concept within the political sciences. To additionally gain an understanding of 
good governance from a Danish development assistance perspective, the book used were: Klavs 
Hede‘s Menneskerettigheder, Demokratisering og Good Governance i Dansk Udviklingspolitik 
(2006), and Friis Bach et al.‘s Idealer og Realiteter (2008).  
To specifically gain an understanding of the ways the security-development nexus could be 
construed, I relied on Mark Duffield‘s Global Governance and the New Wars (2001), and Buur 
et al.‘s The Security Development Nexus (2007). Additionally, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen‘s Den 
Gode Krig? (2011), shed light upon the Danish war efforts in Afghanistan and some of the 
governance struggles of this engagement.  
2.3.2.2 Policy Papers 
As mentioned above, there are certain limitations if solely focusing on speech acts in the case of 
good governance. Good governance‘s significance in a security context is more explicitly 
highlighted when looking at policy papers; hence I also examined key documents regarding 
Danish foreign policy, which incorporate good governance elements. Moreover, I also relied on 
policy papers that dealt with good governance‘s significance from a traditional Danish 
development assistance perspective to understand how it has been dealt with in respect to the 
politicized domain. A full list of the policy papers can be found in Appendix C.  
2.3.2.3 Reports and Manuals 
I mainly used reports and manuals to gain an understanding of (COIN) and Comprehensive 
Approach Strategies. The U.S. COIN manuals (2006; 2009), as well as the RAND organization‘s 
report regarding NATO‘s COIN efforts (2008), served as my main sources. Moreover, in 2009 a 
series of reports were issued by DIIS, which laid the foundation to the current thinking behind 
Danish civil-military cooperation and comprehensive approach strategies. These reports are not 
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directly included in my thesis, but the policy papers used on these subjects can be said to be a 
product of these DIIS reports.  
2.3.2.4 Journal Articles 
Conceptualizing good governance, within development assistance is a contested subject. Grindle 
(2011) served as an overarching article, which laid the groundwork to my understanding of the 
agenda. I used North (1990), to gain an understanding of good governance‘s roots in institutional 
literature whereas Andrews (2008) highlighted good governance as a value-based agenda, 
according to Western ideals.  
Grasping the fragile states agenda proved to be a more challenging task. Unfortunately, a 
discussion regarding this agenda was omitted. Therefore, I relied primarily on traditional 
(institutional) views of state-building and state fragility, utilizing the works of Rotberg (2002), 
Holsti (1996), and Fukuyama (2004). Concerning Danish comprehensive approach strategies I 
used a series of articles published by Danish scholars, including Jakobsen (2014), Breintenbauch 
(2014) and Rasmussen (2013). Lastly, I do not think I would have been able to complete this 
thesis without Kühn (2008), which guided my discussion. 
2.3.2.5 Exclusions 
There were certain trade-offs I had to consider in selecting/excluding my sources, because it 
would have been an immense task to cover all the literature within the boundaries of this paper‘s 
research area. To this end, my primary criterion of selection was whether the literature furthered 
my analysis of good governance‘s securitization. Beneath I highlight some of the prominent 
works excluded based on their irrelevance to my analysis.  
A detailed account of the basic underpinnings of what governance entails was initially included 
(March and Olsen, 1995; Ostrom, 1991), but ultimately excluded because the literature on good 
governance captured the essence of what was necessary to highlight. Rhodes (1996) uses the 
term in relation to the public administration, and the wave of public sector reforms during the 
1980s; an element covered by highlighting the World Bank‘s public sector management 
component. Rosenau‘s (1995) account of governance concerns global governance and IR, but I 
mainly focused on state governance in this paper, which can be interpreted as the main analytical 
level regarding good governance, state fragility and the war efforts in Afghanistan. 
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The question of measuring good governance and its role towards economic development is one 
of the key debates with regards to good governance in a developmental setting (Kaufmann et al. 
1999; North et al., 2007; Moon & Prasad, 1994). However, the arguments presented were 
superfluous to my research area, considering this papers‘ purpose is not to examine whether 
good governance is conducive towards development. 
With regard to the security-development nexus, I excluded some major works (Hurwitz & Peake, 
2004; Gänzle, 2009; Stiglitz, 1998). I was mainly interested in providing a broad overview 
regarding this subject, serving as a bridge to understanding how underdevelopment emerged as a 
threat. This transition is mainly tied to the 1990s, where the merging of security and 
development is witnessed in a policy setting, due to the changing nature of conflicts in the post-
Cold War period. However, the historical origins of security and developments‘ effects on one 
another traces further back (Sörensen & Söderbaum, 2012). According to Hettne (2010), this can 
be traced back as far as 1750. Stern & Öjendal (2010) is an excellent article for a comprehensive 
overview of the nexus, mapping out the nexus and how it has been imbued with different 
meanings in different time-periods.  
2.4 Denmark’s Good Governance Agenda as a Case 
One of the main criteria for a Master Thesis, written in junction with Global Studies, is the 
necessity of highlighting the global scope of one‘s research topic. To address this, I highlight 
throughout that the way in which the Danish good governance agenda has been configured, lends 
itself to how other major global players have used the concept. With regards to the development 
assistance scene, this is witnessed in how Denmark‘s good governance agenda initially was 
based on the World Bank‘s usage of the term and later evolved into a value-based agenda with 
its roots in the DAC‘s mandate.  
Moreover, Denmark has not operated foreign politically in a vacuum and in isolation from its 
allies. This point is underscored, in the analysis of: 1) speech acts concerning terrorism and 
fragile states as a threat, where the Bush and Blair administrations set the international agenda 
regarding the war on terror; 2) the engagement in Afghanistan, which was operationally driven 
by NATO, and; 3) the formulation of comprehensive approach and COIN strategies, where the 
international coalition as a whole saw it necessary to address civil-military cooperation.  
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I do not have the scope to cover all the global players and how they apply good governance, 
hence I have chosen to use Denmark‘s good governance agenda as a case to cover the research 
area of this paper. However, conceptually, it might be helpful to clarify: of what is it a case?  
A case represents only part of the whole empirical reality, of which, some features are 
highlighted and privileged while others recede into the background. A case therefore is a mental 
or analytical construct, which provides a way of organizing our understanding of reality, in turn 
allowing us to state something at the general, abstract and theoretical level (Lund, 2014: 224). 
Lund (ibid) provides an analytical matrix (shown below), to understand what the research is a 
case of. The two ends of the spectrum are cases that observe and gather empirical data, residing 
at the specific and concrete level, and cases that theorize, combining abstract and general levels.   
Figure 1: Case Analytical Matrix 
 
 
 
 
However, seldom do cases reside in one particular category as noted by Lund, ―most claims 
about our cases are a combination of the specific, general, concrete and abstract, and it is the 
movement between these dimensions, that make us conscious of what our work might be a case‖ 
(ibid: 225). Lund argues that to illuminate aspects at the abstract and general level; we apply 
concepts at the concrete and specific levels to understand what our empirical materials 
(observations and the patterns these form) are a sign of at the theoretical level.  
Therefore, it is not a question of whether the Danish example serves as a case of whether good 
governance on a global scale has been securitized; rather it concerns, what the specific and 
concrete unveils regarding the general and abstract. In Section 7.4 I revisit the analytical matrix, 
applying it to my case with the aim, ―to say something about the inherent qualities and dynamics 
in contexts other than the ones studied‖ (ibid: 229).  
 Concrete Abstract 
Specific Observations Concepts 
General Patterns Theories 
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2.5 Research Strategy 
As underscored above, how good governance precisely configures in the security domain is often 
somewhat intricate. At times its implication towards security is in extension of other concepts, or 
requires an understanding of related academic fields. The concept of logical equivalence stems 
from mathematics and posits that two statements are equivalent if they have the same truth-value 
in every model (Mendelson 2015:56). This model is not directly applicable in the case of good 
governance and its equation with security, but it does provide inspiration to my arguments, built 
through a chain of equivalence
1
. I have sought to visualize my analytical strategy with the table 
beneath, which provides a rough overview of this thesis. In the bottom of this table, I present my 
chain of equivalence through terms and concepts that collectively unveil how good governance 
has transitioned into the security domain. This chain represents my interpretation of how good 
governance configures in the security domain and it exemplifies my social construct regarding 
the subject matter of good governance‘s securitization. I have sought to structure this thesis and 
demonstrate this chain in a chronological manner. For the most part, such a sequential structure 
can be traced through Chapters 4-7. 
  
                                                 
1
 The term ‗chain of equivalence‘ was pioneered by Laclau & Mouffe (1985), whom use it in relation to movements 
made up of allied groups seeking broad transformation of existing power relations. This relates to the understanding 
―that if we are to pursue a model of agonistic struggle, existing power differences mean that marginalized and 
disadvantaged groups will need to assemble creative and deeply political strategies to undo the current hegemony‖ 
(Purcell, 2009). Laclau & Mouffe use the term in relation to actors, and how they can achieve a common goal in 
unison. I use this term in a different manner, mainly looking at concepts and terms associated with good governance 
and security, and how these in unison achieve a certain meaning. 
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2.5.1 Analytical Summary 
Figure 2: Analytical Summary 
Chapter 4 5 6 7 
Purpose To look at good 
governance from a 
traditional 
development 
assistance 
perspective, and 
highlight its 
conception within 
this domain. 
Present the speech 
acts, by Danish 
ministers, which 
relate to good 
governance‘s 
potential 
securitization. 
Present the non-
discursive facets, which 
portray how good 
governance has been 
enlisted in the security 
domain.  
To conclude the 
securitization 
analysis and 
highlight some of 
the deficits by 
using the traditional 
Copenhagen School 
approach towards 
my case. 
Main Points 
in Relation to 
Working 
Questions 
Good Governance 
can be construed 
from a broad and 
narrow conception.  
 
The broad 
conception serves as 
a cross-cutting term 
related to democracy, 
legitimacy and 
human rights. 
 
The narrow 
conception concerns 
the effective 
provision of public 
goods related to the 
public administration 
and institutions. 
 
Denmark‘s usage is 
strategically based on 
the broad conception 
as a value-based 
agenda. 
Terrorism was the 
initial presented 
threat, by Danish 
ministers. 
 
Via the security-
development nexus, 
over time, 
underdevelopment 
and fragile states are 
presented as a threat 
as well. 
Three broad examples 
will be made use of 
here: 
 
The agenda on Fragile 
states and how this 
relates to the narrow 
conception of good 
governance.  
 
Good governance 
enlisted from a broad 
conception, because it is 
synonymous with 
legitimacy, human 
rights and democracy; a 
liberal project.  
 
Good governance‘s 
direct usage in a 
military/security 
context. 
Traditional 
extraordinary 
measures and the 
audience‘s accept 
cannot be identified 
using the 
Copenhagen School 
approach solely.  
 
Security 
practitioners 
determine the 
appropriate 
measures (Floyd). 
 
With its established 
context, good 
governance 
configured as a 
term to legitimize 
the efforts against 
the threat (Balzacq) 
 
 
Chain of 
Equivalence  
& 
Key 
Analytical 
Terms 
Good governance 
& development ass. 
 
Narrow conception 
 
Broad conception 
  
Value-based 
agenda 
 
 
Terrorism  
  
Security-
development nexus 
 
Underdevelopment 
 
 Fragile states 
Fragile states and 
narrow conception 
 
State building 
 
Liberal project and 
broad conception 
 
Civ-Mil coop. 
 
Comprehensive app. 
 
Developmentalization 
 
Good governance in a 
security context 
Extraordinary 
measures 
 
Audience‘s 
accept 
 
 The 
securitization of 
good governance? 
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Chapter 3: Theory 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide the foundation to understanding, how Securitization Theory can be 
used to analyze the transition of good governance into the security domain, and what the 
limitations are of the theory in this regard? 
To address this question, I provide an overview of the Copenhagen School‘s Securitization 
Framework and how I intend to use it with respect to my case. I argue that the Securitization 
Framework is a viable theoretical tool regarding my research area due to its broadened 
conceptualization of security. I also highlight some of the limitations inherent to the framework 
regarding the identification of a successful securitization. In addressing this deficit, I will be 
adopting a supplementary sociological approach to securitization, which stresses the importance 
of considering non-discursive elements and the process of constructing security.  
3.2 Security from a Traditional Perspective 
Before delving into the CS‘s Securitization Framework, a broader overview and elaboration of 
security studies is necessary, so as to provide a basic understanding of themes inherent to this 
academic field and the context regarding the CS‘s emergence.  
Notions of state power and survival have always been at the heart of security studies from a 
geopolitical perspective, an influence that can be traced back to Clausewitz‟s military-politico 
contributions to the field of strategic war studies (Smith, 2006:47-48). In addition, the 
Westphalian system
2
 has been instrumental in shaping our understanding of the state and its role 
in an international setting, where the concept of anarchy
3
 prevails. Focus is on the structure in 
this sense; how the international system of anarchy influences states, and the decisions that state-
actors must take in accordance to this reality. This premise entails a security game between 
                                                 
2
 The Peace of Westphalia refers to a doctrine signed in 1648, which concluded the Thirty Years‘ War. During this 
conference, European states agreed to respect the sovereign and territorial integrity of one another, effectively 
entailing equality between states and their recognition as such (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 91). 
3
 In IR, anarchy is the notion of a leaderless world order, hence there is no entity entitled to i.e. resolve disputes and 
enforce law/order. Principally, there is no sovereign above the state, nor a hierarchy between states (Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2007, s. 66).  
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states, with statesmen constructing power politics (e.g. alliance formation, counter threats, power 
balancing), seeking strategically to ensure the survival of the state in response to objective 
military threats (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 91).  
These basic premises inherent to the realist paradigm cohered with the post-World War I period, 
where the discipline of security studies was established (Glaser, 2013). The anarchic setting had 
characterized the escalation period that led to World War I, where power balancing, military 
threats, nationalism, and state survival preoccupied the decision-making of statesmen and 
governments. And with the millions of lives lost in World War I, ―security‖, in relation to 
politico-military issues, became a cornerstone in the field of IR, so as not to replicate experiences 
from the war (Collins, 2013: 1).  
Security, construed in relation to these traditional features, has complied with reality for much of 
the past century - a relevance that still persists. During the Cold War era, ensuring nuclear 
deterrence and state survival without the use of force, gave way to the ‗golden age of security 
studies‘, cementing the importance of this academic field. However, with the conclusion of the 
Cold War and ―the end of history‖, as Fukuyama pronounced, a re-casting of security‘s 
conceptualization took place (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 162). How was security to be 
construed in a unipolar world and with the absence of great power politics? And was security‘s 
conception solely confined to the state and military dimensions, considering that intrastate 
conflicts had a severe bearing on the individual? These questions pre-occupied scholars during 
the 1980s and 1990s, leading to a deepening and broadening of security from a conceptual 
standpoint. A scholarly apprehension though, was whether these new dimensions and concerns, 
risked losing the field‘s academic coherence (Emmers, 2013: 132). Core notions linked to 
security came under scrutiny during this period, Wendt (1992: 391) famously noted for example, 
―anarchy is what states make of it‖, thus tackling a subject that had been thought to be a given 
feature inherent to security studies. For Wendt, anarchy is not a predetermined feature of the 
world order; rather it is a social construction that slowly has formed our understanding of 
security. The Social Constructivist school, direct their attention to how actors shape the world 
(and vice versa), insisting that agents have identities that define their interests. These identities 
are formed, based on shared beliefs, ideas and cultures. An example in this regard, is how 
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democracy, as an idea, underpins the Western hemisphere and its identity; an identity, which has 
shaped the foreign policy of these nations
4
 (Agius, 2013: 88-93).  
The Copenhagen School‘s social constructivist approach to security studies emerged against this 
backdrop, essentially with an intension to broaden security, whilst also preserving the coherence 
of the academic field.  
3.3 The Copenhagen School 
COPRI was established in 1985, with an aim to enhance multidisciplinary research on peace and 
security. The Copenhagen School emerged within COPRI, represented mainly by the works of 
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Arguably the school‘s 1998 book, „Security: A 
New Framework for Analysis‟, is their most influential. The research agenda, behind the CS‘s 
approach, was to bring security in line with the broadening post-Cold War agenda (Buzan et al, 
1998: vii). In response to this, the school adopted a multisectoral approach
5
 to security‘s 
conception, identifying five sectors, and corresponding referent objects, against which we can 
construe security: the military sector (the state), the political sector (ideology), the economic 
sector (trade and finance), the societal sector (the collective identity), the environmental sector 
(the biosphere) (ibid: 7). The premise behind the CS‘s approach is quite simple, namely to 
achieve an understanding of which issues are security concerns and how they transition into this 
domain. This is what we might deem a further politicization of an issue, or by using the 
Copenhagen School‘s term: a securitization.  
The Copenhagen School has devised a securitization spectrum (shown below), which assists the 
analyzer in identifying whether an issue has been securitized. The chart is divided into three 
categories: the non-politicized, a realm where issues are not dealt with by the state; the 
politicized, where an issue is dealt with according to the normal realm of politics; and lastly the 
securitized domain, where issues are dealt with beyond standard political procedures.   
                                                 
4
 Realists on the other hand find that states are identical units, with a similar goal to ensure their survival based on 
material interests. 
5
 With a strict focus on objective military threats, security studies, from a traditional perspective, has been viewed as 
a monosectoral approach. 
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Figure 3: The Securitization Spectrum 
 
Source: Buzan et al., 1998: 23 in Emmers, 2013: 133 
If we revert to the subject of good governance, then it is quite evident that the subject ordinarily 
has been placed within the politicized domain; an element which I elaborate upon in Chapter 4. 
While there is broad consensus that security and development are intertwined, and that 
development to a large extent has been securitized, it remains unanswered whether good 
governance has stepped into the extreme end of the spectrum above. Such an examination 
requires the use of the Copenhagen School‘s Securitization Framework. 
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3.4 The Securitization Framework 
According to Emmers (2013: 132-136), securitization is a two-stage process, consisting of: 1) 
portraying an issue as a security concern, and 2) the successful securitization of the issue.  
3.4.1 Stage One: Speech Acts and Existential Threats 
The securitization process starts with the discursive representation, by a securitizing actor (e.g. 
politicians, lobbyists, etc.
6
), of an issue being existentially threatened, called a speech act. 
Analyzing speech acts requires a discursive outlook, whereby language plays an important role 
because in saying ―security‖ or that ―survival is at stake‖ we give the issue special privilege and 
priority (Buzan et al., 1998: vii).  
The issue being securitized referred to as the referent object, is defined as ―things that are seen to 
be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival‖ (ibid: 36). The referent 
object has conventionally been construed in relation to the state (e.g. government, territory), but 
with the expansion of sectors, referent objects can take on a multitude of forms
7
 (ibid: 21). The 
CS argues that ―survival‖ is a necessary criterion, because if anything and everything can be 
construed in respect to security, nothing in particular, ends up being a security concern (Emmers, 
2013: 132)
8
.  
According to the CS, when issues are linked to security, they are given supreme priority. In this 
sense, it becomes apparent that security is a social construction, or a self-referential practice 
existing within a discursive domain, ―because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a 
security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is 
presented as such a threat‖ (Buzan et al, 1998: 24).  
In essence, the first stage of a securitization analysis entails examining speech acts, because these 
discourses are instrumental towards the identification of what securitizing actors perceive as 
threats. Chapter 5 is devoted to this stage of the securitization analysis, and will accordingly 
                                                 
6
 The CS argues that whilst non-state actors can take on the role of securitizing actors, it is usually state-actors that 
are most likely to succeed, as they are legitimate in the eyes of the audience (Emmers, Securitization, 2013, s. 134) 
7
 Whether this for instance may be the democratic ideology (political sector) or the biosphere threatened by global 
warming (environmental sector). 
8
 The CS argues that there has been a tendency within IR, where level analysis has reinforced state-centric thinking 
(ibid: 5-7). Nevertheless, the criterion of existentially threatened reinforces the traditional conception that security 
essentially concerns survival; this was a deliberate attempt by the CS not to distance itself from realists (Buzan et al, 
1998: iiv).  
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examine the speech acts by Danish ministers, as securitizing actors, to identify the threat(s) and 
the referent object(s). However, the use of language in a security context does not solely portray 
a securitization, bringing us to the second stage of the securitization analysis. 
3.4.2 Stage Two: Extraordinary Measures and the Audiences Accept 
According to Emmers, the successful securitization of an issue requires the audience‘s accept 
and the deployment of extraordinary measures. A distinction is made between securitization and 
a securitizing move in this regard. Securitization only takes place when an audience accepts the 
existential threat towards the referent object. If only a discourse can be identified, and not 
consent from the audience, then it categorizes as a securitizing move (Emmers, 2013: 134-135). 
Securitizing can be directed at the general public and a limited elite audience (Kaunert & 
Le´onard, 2011: 61), although successful securitization cannot be completed without the political 
elite‘s consent since they are vital in granting the deployment of extraordinary measures 
(Emmers, 2013: 140; Roe, 2008: 615).  
The CS argues that if it is established, that a referent object is existentially threatened, the 
securitizing actor will potentially be granted special privileges in dealing with this issue, outside 
the realm of ordinary politics; this is referred to as extraordinary measures. The extraordinary in 
this regard, is understood from the perspective of Carl Schmitt‘s executive unilateralism, which 
denotes the securitizing actor‘s authority to decide if there is an emergency and outlines the 
measures of response (Floyd, 2015: 2). Schmitt (1922) noted that ―sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception‖ (Stanford, 2014), and was focused on examining, why a sovereign has the right 
to move an issue beyond the rule of law, whilst illuminating when these measures are employed 
in the public interest. The CS operates with a similar understanding of exceptionality, namely 
regarding the articulation of ―security‖, and how state actors move issues beyond the realm of 
ordinary politics, because ―by saying security, a state representative declares an emergency 
condition‖ (Buzan et al, 1998: 21). The types of measures adopted obviously depend on the 
context, though it usually involves injecting urgency into the matter to gain political support for 
the project (Emmers, 2013: 135). In the most severe cases, extraordinary measures refer to e.g. 
curtailing civil liberties, imposing martial law, detaining political opponents without trial (ibid). 
However, the CS notes that extraordinary measures need not always be adopted, to portray a 
securitization, though existential threats must ―gain enough resonance for a platform to be made 
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from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures‖ (Buzan et al, 1998: 25). 
3.4.3 Criticisms 
The CS‘s Securitization Framework was instrumental in validating the expansion of the security 
domain, but the objective to push the boundaries of security studies has attracted both 
considerable acclaim and criticism. Critics have pointed at the school‘s narrow focus on 
discourse, its absence of context, and questioned the role of the audience and extraordinary 
measures towards a successful securitization. 
As the CS note (1998: 177), ―discourse analysis can uncover one thing: discourse‖. 
Consequently the framework has been criticized for its emphasis on the speech act and its 
exclusion of non-discursive elements, such as bureaucratic practices, policy tools and images that 
play important roles in constructing and communicating what security might entail (Does 2013). 
Williams (2003) has noted for instance that media images of the 9/11 terrorist attack (e.g. TV 
pictures of planes colliding with the World Trade Centre) were momentous to the perceptions of 
terrorism as a threat. To this end, Williams argues that the role of images in a ‗‗media-saturated 
environment‘‘ must be taken into consideration (Williams 2003: 526).  
Another major criticism concerns the notion of the audience. The CS stress the importance of the 
audience in the securitization process, because they grant the extraordinary measures in tackling 
a threat, however, their role can be considered somewhat under-theorized. Léonard and Kaunert 
(2011: 57) have highlighted the contradiction that on the one hand, the CS argues that the 
audience are essential towards a successful securitization (Buzan et al 1998: 30). However, this 
idea is later negated when the CS argues that ―it is the actor who decides whether something is 
handled as an existential threat‖ (ibid: 34). This incongruity is highlighted by Balzacq (2005: 
179), who questions whether the securitization process should be considered a self-referential 
practice or an intersubjective one. 
Other scholars have noted that the audience can likely consist of more than one party. Roe 
(2008) argues that the audience comprises of both the general public, who offer moral support on 
an issue, responsible for rendering it a security issue and policy makers who formally approve of 
extraordinary measures to deal with the threat. 
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Criticism has also pointed at the exclusion of context. As McDonald (2008: 564) argues ―the 
potential for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and 
representations is not addressed‖ by the framework, it places a focus on the moment of the 
speech act
9
.  
3.4.4 The Sociological Approach to Securitization 
The CS‘s emphasis on the power of language, “by saying security - something is done” (Wæver, 
1995: 55), has been deemed a philosophical approach to securitization; equating security with the 
speech act (Balzacq & Guzzini, 2014: 3). A sociological variant to securitization, pioneered by 
Belgian political scientist, Thierry Balzacq, has emerged, which stands in contrast to the self-
referential and discursive outlook of the CS. Balzacq brings forth a pragmatic angle to 
securitization, building his argument around three interlinked points: 
 ―1) that an effective securitization is audience-centered; 2) that securitization is context-
dependent; 3) that an effective securitization is power-laden.‖ (Balzacq, 2005: 171)  
To understand Balzacq‘s points, an elaboration of the linguistics behind speech acts is necessary. 
Securitization theory adheres to a linguistic formula, based on John L. Austin‘s Theory of Speech 
Act, which demonstrates that certain utterances can realize specific actions; words can 
performatively ―do‖ things. A speech act consists of three types of acts:  
―1) locutionary, the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference; 
2) illocutionary, the act performed in articulating a locution; 3) perlocutionary, which is 
the ‗consequential effects‘ or ‗sequels‘ that are aimed at evoking the feelings, beliefs, 
thoughts or actions of the target audience.― (ibid: 175)10.  
Balzacq posits, that for securitization to be solely a discursive and self-referential, all the three 
abovementioned acts must be taken seriously in their concise and formal meaning. The 
Copenhagen School‘s framework hinges on the perlocutionary effect, which according to 
Balzacq cannot be denounced to solely being self-referential (Balzacq, 2005: 177). For a 
                                                 
9
 Other criticisms of the CS‘s approach include: Aradau (2004), whom highlights the consequences and objective of 
de-securitizing issues; Booth (2007) and Hansen (2000) whom highlight that securitization is elitist, claiming those 
outside the discourse are silenced. 
10
 Put more simply, ―the act of saying something, to act in saying something, and to bring about something through 
acting in saying something‖ (ibid). 
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successful perlocutionary effect to take place and, gaining the crucial acceptance from the 
audience, a certain context is needed. Balzacq argues that the audience is only likely to accept a 
speech act, when feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions are evoked, based on their preconceptions 
of the referent object and the threat (ibid: 175). External realities and objective circumstances are 
necessary in providing this context, or as Balzacq notes, ―the speaker has to tune his/her 
language to the audience‘s experience‖ (ibid: 184). Thus, if external realities and a certain 
context is necessary for the audience, security cannot be confined to the self-referential speech 
act domain. Instead, a broader spectrum of practices based on real-life contexts must be 
considered when analyzing the securitization process, according to Balzacq.   
In essence, the sociological variant, offers a non-linguistic approach to securitization, where 
several forms of representing a securitization can come into play (e.g. images, material, 
bureaucratic practices). These factors play an equally important role in conveying and 
constructing security concerns, but do not solely reside within the speech act domain 
(McDonald, 2008). In contrast to the internal CS approach, Balzacq argues in favor of a 
pragmatic angle to understanding securitization (Balzacq, 2011), emphasizing the importance of 
comprehending how security is constructed. The argument proceeds that policy papers, as a tool, 
are essential to understanding how securitizing actors tackle a threat, because they define the 
measures for dealing with it. Security is constructed herein, due to the real implications and 
effects that such policy papers bring to the world, which is witnessed in how these documents  
bring about new security practices. Speech acts might bring security concerns to the public 
attention, but the real life implementation of methods and the concrete dealing with a threat, is to 
be found in practices and security policies.  
This is linked to the restrictions of the audience‘s accept and extraordinary measures integral to a 
successful securitization, which make its identification notoriously difficult. Pinpointing the 
audience‘s accept for instance, can be an ambiguous task prone to subjective interpretation from 
the analyzer‘s perspective (Kaunert & Le´onard, 2011). Even public polls lack the necessary 
depth of highlighting a broad general accept. Moreover, Floyd argues that the suspension of law 
altogether, does not always define extraordinary measures, as advocated from a Schmittian 
perspective, because Western democracies seldom adopt extraordinary measures from the severe 
Schmittian perspective. However, if extraordinary measures can take on the form of non-
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exceptionality, it is unclear where the line is to be drawn regarding issues that have been 
securitized or not (Floyd, 2015: 16).  
One of the more fundamental issues with extraordinary measures is the constructivist deficit 
identified by Ciută (2009), whom notes that scholars and not actors decide when securitization is 
‗successful‘, which in essence undermines the CS‘s claim that ―our securitization approach is 
radically constructivist regarding security […] Security issues are made security issues by acts of 
securitization‖ (Buzan et al, 0998: 204). 
As further elaborated by Floyd (2015), securitization from a CS perspective relies on arbitrary 
benchmarks concerning the audience‘s accept and the deployment of extraordinary measures, 
―but should look instead at what practitioners of security do when they securitize‖ (Floyd, 2015: 
3). Floyd proposes that the practitioners whom securitize issues, rather than scholars, should be 
the ones to determine if a securitization has taken place; ―let practitioners decide when 
something is successfully securitized, as opposed to advancing a fixed view of when this is the 
case‖ (Floyd, 2015: 5). The security practitioner refers in this instance to an individual, whom 
has been involved in formulating, making and delivering security policy. The measure, from 
Floyd‘s perspective, should rather be determined by what the practitioners see as the proper 
measure in response to a threat. As she notes, ―In the end, the exception here may be whatever 
most reasonable persons would agree constitutes exceptional measures, mainly in terms of the 
harm, risked, caused or intended and/or the level of violence employed‖ (ibid: 2). With their 
ability to influence the securitization process, the role of security practitioners is hence important 
to consider with regard to the question of who has the power to securitize.  
To summarize, the sociological approach calls for the necessity of considering non-discursive 
elements towards a securitization, whilst also questioning how a successful securitization is 
conducted. In supplement to analyzing speech acts, I will in Chapter 6 examine non-discursive 
factors, by looking at Danish foreign policy papers, wherein according to Balzacq security is 
constructed. The second stage of a securitization analysis traditionally revolves around the 
identification of extraordinary measures and the audience‘s accept. However, in Chapter 7 I will 
be addressing the constructivist deficit by considering the view of security practitioners (Floyd), 
and highlight the importance of good governance‘s contextual value, enabling the audience‘s 
accept (Balzacq).   
27 
 
3.5 Sub-conclusion 
The securitization framework is a viable theoretical approach to examining good governance‘s 
transition into the security domain, not least due to the fact that the CS calls for a broadened 
conceptualization of security, including non-military factors. Good governance‘s role in the 
security domain does not relate to objective military threats, hence a multi-sectorial approach to 
security must be considered. The intensions behind the CS‘s theoretical framework align with the 
interests inherent to this paper; understanding how non-military issues can be interpreted as 
security concerns. Breaking securitization into Emmer‘s two-stage process - portraying an issue 
as a security concern, and the successful securitization of the issue - is helpful to understanding 
how I will conduct my analysis.  
Regarding the first stage, the CS‘s approach dictates that securitization revolves around a 
discourse in the form of threats presented by securitizing actors. I will be examining speech acts 
by Danish ministers, to which end I argue that ―terrorism‖, ―underdevelopment‖ and ―fragile 
states‖ are the presented threats by these securitizing actors. However, this is where my 
adherence to the CS‘s approach ends because the theory is limited when considering how a 
certain entity is framed as a threat, not taking into account the context and/or practices. In the 
case of good governance, the term itself seldom configures in the speech acts and it is not 
presented directly as a threat.   
By incorporating elements from the sociological approach to my analysis, will enable me to 
demonstrate that good governance configures in the security domain, via the concept‘s 
enlistment in Danish foreign policy papers. In the analysis I argue that good governance‘s 
enlistment can be identified in three manners: 1) the narrow conception of good governance and 
the fragile state agenda, 2) the broad conception of good governance, primarily linked to the 
engagement in Afghanistan, and 3) with regards to the notion‘s role in a military context. 
Adopting Floyd and Balzacq‘s views on securitization facilitates a discussion, whether a 
successful securitization of good governance has occurred. To this end, I will highlight how: 1) 
security practitioners have viewed good governance as the proper measure in dealing with the 
threat, and; 2) that good governance has played a vital role in legitimizing the efforts against the 
threats, because of the concept‘s ―contextual values‖. Drawing upon the securitization 
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spectrum‘s stages towards a securitization, the table below outlines how I apply securitization 
theory to my analysis. 
Figure 4: Application of Securitization to Analysis 
Good Governance in the Politicized Domain 
Chapter 4 Here I lay the foundation to understanding good governance within the realm of 
ordinary politics, which illuminates the background and preconceptions 
surrounding this subject. This chapter is key in respect to understanding good 
governance‘s context, as advocated by Balzacq.  
Good Governance’s Transition to the Securitized Domain 
Chapter 5 This chapter concerns stage one of the securitization process, which will entail 
examining speech acts and discourse presented by Danish ministers as 
securitizing actors, with the goal to uncover the threat and referent object.  
Chapter 6 This chapter examines non-discursive elements, which portray how good 
governance has been enlisted in the security domain. This part is important 
towards an examination of how security is constructed outside the discursive 
realm (Balzacq), whilst it also highlights the security practitioner‘s perspective 
(Floyd).  
Good Governance’s Successful Securitization? 
Chapter 7 This chapter discusses stage two of the securitization process, where I apply the 
sociological approach to understanding whether good governance‘s securitization 
has been successful. This will entail forming an understanding of what constitutes 
extraordinary measures in the case of good governance, and what role the 
audience‘s accept has played towards the securitization process.  
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Chapter 4: Context 
Good Governance in the Politicized Domain 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the working question, how has good governance been construed within 
the development assistance scene, and to this end, what has been the Danish prioritization 
regarding this field? 
As advocated by Balzacq, considering context is key towards a securitization analysis because 
the audience‘s accept is evoked based on preconceptions surrounding the issue being securitized. 
To shed light on good governance‘s context, I will in this chapter highlight the concept‘s role 
within the politicized domain. I demonstrate that good governance can be construed in relation to 
two overarching conceptions, which have taken the form of a broad and narrow agenda, both of 
which, in their respective manners, imbue a sense of the Western ideal state. I argue that the 
Danish prioritization regarding the application of good governance has taken the form of a value-
based agenda founded on the broad conception of good governance.  
4.2 What is Good Governance? 
Good governance
11
 is an indeterminate concept, applied by international institutions and donors 
with regard to international development schemes. Through good governance programs, the 
development community seeks to promote the effective and proper provision of public goods in 
the Third World. What constitutes the promotion of good governance can take on a variety of 
forms, whereby its agenda has a reputation of being broad encompassing, notoriously difficult to 
define, and challenging to measure and evaluate (Grindle, 2016: 1). An example of this is the 
World Development Report, which identifies 116 items relating to promoting good governance; 
indicative of how difficult the notion is to coherently conceptualize (World Bank, 2000). As 
stated by the World Bank, the ambiguity of good governance‘s application is due to the fact that 
it ―is defined in terms of the mechanisms thought to be needed to promote it‖ (World Bank, 
                                                 
11
 For a more thorough account of governance see Appendix D. 
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2009). Fundamentally, good governance is subject to individual and subjective interpretations 
and at its core, is a normative term (Hede, 2006: 199-203).  
This comes to show regarding the lacking clarity, of whether the notion is to be construed as a 
means, an ends, or both at the same time (Grindle, 2011: 1-2). Donors use it as a tool towards 
socio-economic development and democratization (ibid). However, good governance can also be 
understood as desired goal to be achieved; ―a one-best-way model, ostensibly of an idyllic, 
developed country government: Sweden or Denmark on a good day, perhaps‖ (Andrews, 2008: 
379). Accordingly, the good governance agenda represents a Western ideal of the good 
government, and imbues a teleological narrative of how this status is achieved (Rodrik, 2008: 17-
18).  
With this in mind – good governance is an ideal and a normative concept - it is thus important to 
be precise in which context one understands the concept. As noted by Thomsen (2016: 18), good 
governance ―can broadly speaking be divided into two parts, one which concerns public sector 
management and decentralization, and one which has more to do with the field of human rights 
and democracy‖. As such, while many approaches to the abovementioned mechanisms can be 
identified, two overarching categories stand out: a narrow and broad sense.  
- The narrow sense revolves around the actual content of the processes, by which the 
steering and management of governance is implemented and administered.   
- The broad sense focuses on the formal and institutional layout concerning the form of 
government, whereby good governance has come to serve as an umbrella term regarding 
crosscutting issues of human rights and democratization.  
 
To summarize, the broad sense is occupied with the general question of which form of 
government is ―good‖, and the narrow sense addresses which principals and processes a 
particular form of government should govern, manage, respond to and act according to (Hede, 
2006: 201-203). A common theme these conceptions share is a focus on the relationship between 
the duty-bearers and rights-holders, and their respective obligations. As noted by Jensen (2016: 
5), ―good governance can be understood as a supply side, where the state is obligated as a duty-
bearer to provide its citizens with basic public good, while the demand side of the citizens have 
the right to claim these goods‖.  Let us now take a closer look at the narrow and broad 
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conception, so as to fully understand the mechanisms and conceptual underpinnings attached to 
these. 
4.3 The Narrow Sense of the Term 
The narrow sense is linked to a wide literature on comparative politics in relation to the state and 
economic development (Kjær, 2004: 123-147).  More specifically, this interpretation deals with 
the public administration‘s capacity to implement policies and strategies that are relevant and 
effective in relation to development (Hede, 2006: 226-227). A typical definition from this 
perspective would be the World Bank‘s, which states that good governance is:  
―Epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued 
with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; 
and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of 
law.‖ (World Bank, 1992) 
The academic underpinnings of this definition, can be traced to how North (1990) makes use of 
governance, whom notes that development trajectories are an effect of a long term evolution of 
rules of the game and specific institutional configurations. Accordingly, the interplay between 
political and economic institutions is essential to understanding the basis of economic growth. In 
this respect, North makes note of two distinct state institutional setups that of a limited access 
order society and open access order societies (North, 1990). Limited access order societies are 
characterized by a political stability founded upon the brokering between the ruling elites, whom 
are granted ―privileged control over parts of the economy, each getting some share of the rents‖ 
(North et al, 2011). Open access order societies, are based upon multi-party systems and a secure 
governmental monopoly over violence, because an open access and competition towards rents 
prevails (North, 2007: 3-4).  
These facets have been the foundation regarding the World Bank‘s application of good 
governance within the development scene. The Bank introduced the good governance 
development agenda in the early 1990s, ―because it needed to explain why a number of countries 
failed to develop, in spite of the fact that they had adopted the neo-liberal adjustment policies 
imposed on them by the World Bank‖ (Kjær, 2004: 138). The World Bank‘s Structural 
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Adjustment Programs entailed strict oversight and regulation, effectively putting the Bank in the 
driver‘s seat with regard to the economy of loan receivers. Little had thus been achieved in 
building institutional capacity within the state apparatus of loan receivers, while the political elite 
―served their own interests without fear of being called to account‖ (World Bank, 1989: 60). 
Factors of nepotism, corruption, and clientelism had undermined the progress of the SAPs 
according to the World Bank (Kjær, 2004: 173; Friis Bach et al, 2008: 472). As such, the Bank‘s 
sense of ―bad‖ governance fed into the terminology on limited access order societies; the lack of 
transparency and accountability within the public sector, was the obstacle, which hindered 
economic growth.  
4.3.1 The World Bank’s Good Governance Agenda 
The World Bank‘s mandate, according to its Articles of Agreement, does not cover interfering 
with the form of political regime of a given country. According to Article 1, this purpose is 
limited to economic development, precluding the Bank from taking into account non-economic 
factors (IBRD, 2012: 3).  
The World Bank argues in their 1992 report, ‗Governance and Development‘ that their mandate 
concerns primarily the promotion of good governance via:   
- The processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country‘s 
economic and social resources; and 
- The capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies, and, in 
general to discharge government functions. (World Bank, 1992: 1) 
These two aspects closely relate to the narrow conception of the term, centering on the steering 
and management of governance and how policy is implemented and administered. The narrow 
conception basically concerns the provision of public goods in an effective and transparent 
manner. In its application within development assistance, the narrow good governance agenda is 
mainly tied to four components: Public Sector Management, Accountability, Legal Framework 
for Development, and Transparency & Information. As such, the public administration and state 
institutions are the focal points. These components are elaborated as follows: 
1. Promoting public sector management relates to the public sector's capacity and its obligations 
for formulating and implementing policies that strengthen public programs, the effective 
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management of the public sectors resources, monies and personnel. This typically revolves 
around reforming the public sector according to Western public administrative standards of e.g. 
privatization, cut-backs, capacity training of government employees, tax collection, introducing 
new technologies, restructuring, etc. (Heywood, 2007: 391). One might say that the background 
to this component stems from a conviction, that effective governance is sine qua non sustainable 
development (Hede, 2006: 207).   
2. Promoting accountability concerns the administrative accountability of the public sector and 
its civil servants, whilst it also revolves around strengthening the rights holder institutions, which 
hold the government accountable (i.e. ombudsman, the Auditor General, etc.). As such, 
accountability is seen as vital component towards anti-corruption and altering circumstances, 
which give way to corrosive practices within the public administration. In essence, accountability 
seeks to ensure compliance between public policies and their actual implementation, and to 
guarantee the effective distribution and use of public resources (Hede, 2006: 207-208).  
3. Legal Framework for Development, the legal system‘s enforcement of rule of law, which is 
seen as conducive for socio-economic development. It concerns regulating and enforcing rules 
that make a market efficiently work, for example through private property and contract rights. 
This feeds into the notion of inclusive institutional setups, wherein the rule of law is seen as a 
necessary provider of safety for private actors, so as to ensure that the state does not 
indiscriminately intervene (ibid: 208).  
4. Transparency and Information, builds on the notion that for a competitive market-economy to 
flourish, economic actors need access to relevant and trustworthy information (e.g. transparency 
regarding legal procedures; access to the state‘s budgets, economy and statistics; the existence of 
a free and independent media) (Hede, 2006: 206-210).  
In synthesis, these four components reflect how the World Bank has focused on good 
governance in relation to economic factors; the Bank sees an effective and accountable state 
apparatus as an enabler for a stable, secure and predictable economic development.  
From the onset of the Bank‘s inception in the post-World War II era, it has been seen as an 
institution professionally bound to advise on technical economic matters. In reality, this has been 
difficult to maintain since its member states have been able to influence its decision-making 
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processes (Toussaint & Millet, 2010). Several authors have highlighted how the Bank has not 
been completely objective in its prescriptions and the technical advice it has given (Evans, 1995; 
Khan, 2012). As noted by Moore (1993) and Chang (2003), the World Bank‘s good governance 
agenda does not empirically recognize the success of the East Asian economies and their 
development trajectories. For instance, the Washington Consensus‘12 recommendation of 
complete trade liberalization did not take into account how protectionist policies had led to 
economic growth in East Asia.  
Most importantly it is necessary to recognize that the processes and mechanism that the World 
Bank has tied to promoting good governance, have been imbued with a Western sense of an 
effective public administration. As such, the Bank‘s ―politicized‖ promotion of good governance 
is not based within its legal framework, but through the ideological underpinnings that have 
embodied the Bank‘s promotion of good governance.  
Firstly, the World Bank‘s good governance agenda is characterized by a set of policies that 
adhere to New Public Management (NPM) standards
13
 (Kjær, 2004: 25), based on a rationale 
that expenditure reduction, privatization and public sector reform meant not only less 
government, but also better government. In essence, NPM standards carried over private sector 
management principals to the public sector, stressing elements of hands-on professional 
management, explicit standards of measures of performance, managing by results, and ―value for 
money‖ (Rhodes, 1996: 93). These set of prescriptions and their application by the WB in the 
Global South, were coupled with the Washington Consensus, which underscored global 
economic (market) integration in contrast to isolationist state developmental policies.  
Moreover, the Bank aims to enforce a professional public administration and bureaucracy with 
an ethos according to Weberian ideals
14
. Cornerstone to the Bank‘s prescriptions, are a 
                                                 
12
 The Washington Consensus was first coined 1989, and addresses the neo-liberal macro-economic prescriptions 
promoted by the IMF and WB from the 80s and onward. Ten general neo-liberal policies were identified, 
encompassing the consensus, ranging from privatization of state enterprises, to trade liberalization, to broader fiscal 
policies. 
13
 Which were a set of neo-conservative public sector reform principals that swept across the West during the 1980s. 
The main proponents and initial first-movers regarding this agenda were the Thatcher and Reagan administrations– 
but the West has broadly followed suit and developed similar policies since then.  
14
 Webers sense of the effective bureaucracy covers many themes, and he has stipulated a list of features, which 
define it, to name a few: meritocratic processes of recruitment, training, and career promotion; hierarchical and 
centralized decision making authority within large scale organizational structures; public officials are full time 
salaried career professionals with job security (Kjær, 2004: 127). 
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separation of public and private interests within the public administration and its bureaucracy. By 
this, the ideal form of governance with respect to the processes of steering society, are based on 
Weber‘s principals regarding the modern bureaucracy, embedded with the sense that, ―public 
moneys and equipment are divorced from the private property of the official‖ (Weber, 1978: 
957). For this reason, factors of transparency, accountability and anti-corruption play an 
important role in the WB‘s good governance agenda.  
The World Bank‘s mandate might not be politically bound, but the processes by which good 
governance is promoted have their roots in Western ideals of how an effective state apparatus is 
configured. This is an important point to bring across, because the narrow good governance 
conception is very technical in its application, and could essentially be misinterpreted as a de-
politicized agenda. The economic focus and the technical approach to good governance, can give 
the impression that the narrow conception is based on objective economic sciences
15
. 
The international community of donors has been more direct in their ―political‖ promotion of 
good governance, and has tied several normative notions of democracy and human rights to their 
conception of good governance. As noted by Ole Therkildsen (DIIS), ―no country has ever 
practiced a donor-agenda, where good governance has come prior to socio-economic growth‖ 
(Information, 2012). Therkildsen addresses in this instance, his critique of good governance as a 
means towards economic development, which in essence is what the narrow conception and the 
World Bank agenda concerns. However, donors promote good governance, not only because of 
economic factors. Former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Friis Bach, responded to 
Therkildsen‘s comment that ―Good governance entails, that we do not solely wish to see 
countries with economic growth, but also governance where people are not imprisoned for 
voicing their opinions, are not tortured, and women‘s rights are not violated. Hence I am intent 
on keeping these fundamental values, which we base our development assistance upon” (ibid). 
Friis Bach thus argues that good governance, not only should be promoted because of its 
developmental effects but also because the agenda covers a certain set of values.  
                                                 
15
 The World Governance Indicators and various other governance measuring projects, are arguably the most 
profound example of seeking to objectify good governance.  
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4.4 The Broad Sense of the Term 
The broad sense of good governance serves as an umbrella term capturing the components a 
given donor wishes to promote. There is to a certain extent a common acceptance that good 
governance from this perspective: 
―Promotes equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule of 
law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring.  In translating these principles 
into practice, we see the holding of free, fair and frequent elections, representative 
legislatures that make laws and provides oversight, and an independent judiciary to 
interpret those laws.‖ (UN) 
The UN‘s definition underscores (to higher degree than the World Bank) democratic aspects, 
touching upon multiple elements of value-based agendas. Apart from the Development 
Assistance Committee‘s (DAC)16 guidelines, the promotion of good governance, from a bilateral 
perspective, is not constrained by the mandate of an overarching multilateral entity. As such, the 
individual donor country‘s promotion of good governance can take on many forms within the 
limits of national legislation. Therefore, the promotion of good governance by donors can 
emphasize and assert politicized features to a higher degree. To examine the traits of this broad 
conception, let us look at how Denmark has dealt with its political and crosscutting nature.  
4.4.1 The Danish Good Governance Agenda within Development Assistance 
The Danish International Development Agency (Danida)
17
 does not operate with a single 
definition of good governance; it applies good governance with an emphasis on the broad 
conception from a strategic policy perspective, with narrow dimensions also being identified at 
program level.  
                                                 
16
 The DAC is a sub-committee within the OECD, which effectively serves as a forum wherein issues of aid, 
development and poverty reduction are discussed and coordinated amongst its members; with a goal to establish a 
common political framework surrounding these subjects (DAC, 2010: 3). According to Article 1 of the OECD‘s  
mandate, its primary purpose is to promote cooperation regarding economic and social development (OECD, 1960: 
1).  
17
 It should be mentioned, that in the 1990s an administrative restructuring took place within the Danish foreign 
services, where Danida went from being an independent unit to entity under the auspices of the Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Danida, as an expression of Danish development assistance has been withheld, not least because of 
the value attached to the word as a ―brand‖. In this paper, I will interchangeably use the terms Danish development 
assistance and Danida, because of their synonymic value.   
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4.4.1.1 Sector-Led Programs and Conditionalities 
Danida introduced good governance principles in the 1994 strategy, ‗En Verden I Udvikling‘, 
coupled with a new focus on sector-led programs rather than project-based schemes; a 
reconfiguration known as, ‗Strategy 2000‘ (MFA, 1994). Denmark‘s development assistance had 
been subject to project-led failures, with local capacities failing in continuing projects and 
incoordination between donors leading to duplication of projects in some instances (Friis Bach et 
al, 2008: 423). Sector-led programs entail that aid recipients have an increased responsibility in 
applying and controlling development funds towards whole sectors (agriculture, health, 
education, etc.) (Hede, 2006, s. 218-219). To this extent, ―state capacity‖, in terms of effective 
public administration became a central theme to Danida‘s ‗Strategy 2000‘ and the consecutive 
1996 paper, ‗Poverty‘ (MFA, 1996). Multiple Danida advisors were hired during this period and 
placed in the central administration of aid recipient countries. Development assistance was 
therefore lifted up to the politico-administrative hierarchies, due to the new involvement of 
different government officials that traditionally were not tied to this arena (e.g. permanent 
secretaries, state auditors, ombudsmen). In other words, development cooperation moved deeply 
into government corridors, at local and central levels. While the initial intention behind sector-
led programs was envisaged in how the World Bank operated, it had somewhat unintentional 
political consequences. The meddling of affairs with central administrations in recipient 
countries produced an active interference with development policies. So, paradoxically as sector-
led programming was being heralded with building local and state capacity, in reality, 
interference from Danida was immense (Friis Bach et al, 2008: 473).  
As remarked by Friis Bach et al (2008), this marked a new phase for Danish development 
assistance. To a higher degree, requirements and demands came to define Danish development 
priorities: “It was no longer enough to give from rich to poor. Now, conditionalities were being 
imposed” (ibid: 472).  These conditionalities were mainly characterized by a demand for 
countries to promote respect for human rights, good governance, political pluralism, and 
democracy. The same that were ascribed to the stipulated criterions of aid-guidelines discussed at 
the high-level DAC meeting of Paris in 1991. Moreover, at the global conference on human 
rights in Vienna 1993, it was established for the first time that it was the legitimate duty of the 
international society to protect human rights in all UN member countries (ibid). 
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These conditionalities should also be read in the context of the Cold War‘s conclusion, whereby 
the geopolitical and security agenda rationale, behind development assistance, had become 
obsolete. During this period, aid recipients were competing for a smaller pool of Official 
Development Assistance (ODAs), hence the new ―donor-darlings‖, were those whom adhered to 
Western ideology.  
The DAC has identified four primary political agendas, which its members since have 
coordinated their promotion of: Participatory Development, Democratization, Good Governance 
and Human Rights. These agendas are described as closely related to one another, by which is 
meant, that each of them are mutually supportive and affect one another. Good governance‘s 
coupling with human rights, democracy and participatory development had the effect that good 
governance became part of a value-based ―package‖. These aspects were linked together, which 
Lindkvist noted (2016: 8) ―with the underlying assumption that if you have good governance in 
the form of an effective and functioning democracy, then you have better conditions for human 
rights and meeting basic needs.‖  
4.4.1.2 The Right to a Better Life 
In a Danish policy context, since the 1993 policy paper, ‗Human Rights and Democracy in 
Danish Development Assistance‘, good governance has been coupled with a focus on human 
rights and the public administration‘s democratic legitimacy. The understanding of good 
governance as a vital element towards democratic processes, was also expressed in the policy 
papers ‘Partnership 2000‘ (MFA, 2001) and ‘En Verden til Forskel‘ (MFA, 2003). This concept 
also became a central element regarding the framework of the Danish Democracy Fund, whose 
purpose was to promote and consolidate democratization processes (Hede, 2006: 228-229).  
‗The Right to a Better Life‘, issued in 2012, is currently the main strategic document for Danish 
development assistance.  It is a Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA), which is composed of 
four key principles: participation, non-discrimination, accountability and transparency. Here, 
good governance is a crosscutting issue that has a bearing on all of the principals. Accordingly, 
this approach blends themes of democratization, human rights and good governance, tying these 
aspects to (human) development.  
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With the introduction of this policy paper, the Danish Law on International Development 
Cooperation was revised. The previous legal framework listed economic growth as an imperative 
priority (Retsinformation, 1998), however when ‗The Right to a Better Life‘ was issued, the 
promotion of human rights and democracy became main priorities:  
―The goal with Denmark's development cooperation is to combat poverty and promote 
human rights, democracy, sustainable development, peace and stability in accordance 
with the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN conventions on 
human rights.‖ (Retsinformation, 2012) 
From a legislative perspective, an emphasis on values came to define Danish development 
assistance. Danish politicians have since emphasized the importance of promoting human rights, 
good governance and democracy, not only because of the developmental logic but because 
development assistance should be based on this set of values. As former Minister of 
Development, Ulla Tørnæs remarked,  
―We must not reduce democracy, good governance, rule of law and respect for human 
rights to 'tools' that can only be justified if it can be unequivocally proven that they lead 
to development. These are fundamental values, which is a justification in itself" 
(Information, 2006) 
In a Danish context, the promotion of good governance is mainly construed in relation to the 
broad conception and as a value-based agenda. Denmark has had a history, since the early 1990s, 
of basing its development assistance with regards to values, which can be attributed to the how 
development assistance increasingly became politicized during this period.  
4.5 Sub-Conclusion 
Good governance is essentially a normative notion, and the promotion of it presents a Western 
ideal of how the state should operate. The agenda covers many themes related to a narrow and 
broad approach. The broad, value-based agenda uses good governance as an umbrella term 
concerning the ―good‖ government according to aspects of democratization and human rights. In 
contrast, the narrow approach primarily concerns the capacity of public administrations and 
institutions and their ability to implement policies that benefit society broadly.  
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International donors view ―bad‖ governance as a challenge that hinders socio-economic 
development; to this end the promotion of good governance is viewed as a measure that fosters 
development. Nonetheless, it can be questioned if this is the sole driver towards implementing 
good governance programs. In a Danish context, it is important to promote good governance, 
since it entails spreading values of human rights and democracy to ‗un-democratic‘ regimes. The 
politicization of development assistance in the 1990s, through conditionalities, shifted the 
strategic purpose with development assistance towards a value-based agenda. ‗The Right to a 
Better Life‘ and the alteration of legislation has further cemented the role of the value-based 
agenda, with Danish politicians also articulating good governance in this regard. 
Within the Danish politicized domain, good governance is epitomized by representing Western 
values, whose features constitute the preconceptions and context the audience associates with it. 
The following chapters will examine whether good governance has transitioned from the 
politicized domain to the far end of the securitized spectrum.  
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Part Two: Analysis  
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Chapter 5: Discourse 
Speech Acts, Threats and Referent Objects 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to address the working question: what has discursively been represented as 
a threat, by Danish securitizing actors, when it comes to the field of good governance? 
 
A securitization analysis begins with the discursive representation, by a securitizing actor, of a 
referent object being existentially threatened. Accordingly, this chapter examines speech acts by 
Danish ministers, where I demonstrate that ―terrorism‖ in the immediate post-9/11 period was 
articulated as a threat towards the Danish state (military sector) and Western values (political 
sector) as referent objects. Focusing on addressing the root-causes of terrorism by incorporating 
development assistance in the security domain, ―underdevelopment‖ and ―fragile states‖ 
emerged as perceived threats.  
5.2 The War on Terror 
The events of 9/11 shook the West, inducing a fear that similar attacks would soon be replicated. 
In the rubble of the World Trade Center, George Bush officially declared a global war on terror 
(Bush, 2001a); as remarked in his speech: ―Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does 
not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped 
and defeated‖. The U.S. has tradition of declaring ―wars‖ against specific issues (e.g. war on 
drugs under the Reagan administration), yet despite this tradition, the significance of declaring 
war should not be downplayed. As noted by Møller (2009: 6): ―It signifies that the gloves come 
off and that normal rules and behavioral constraints no longer apply‖. For these gloves to come 
off, so to speak, essentially two dimensions were inherent to the threat perception and were 
presented regarding the war on terror. 
  
The war on terror was about safety and security in its most basic form. It concerned the lives and 
well-being of U.S. citizens, which Bush later stated in a State of the Union address that there 
were ―thousands of dangerous killers (terrorists), schooled in the methods of murder, often 
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supported by outlaw regimes, spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off 
without warning‖ (Bush, 2001b).  
 
Global terrorism was perceived as a concrete threat that could target citizens of the Global North, 
though it also concerned the values that the West stood for; ―they (terrorists) hate our freedoms - 
our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree 
with each other.‖ (Bush, 2001a). To use the terms provided by the Copenhagen School, the threat 
perception of terrorism was two-fold, concerning lives of American citizens, relating to the 
military sector, and the political sector of Western values and ideology. 
 
To address this threat, a broad coalition was formed after 9/11, and Afghanistan was invaded. 
The NATO coalition‘s aim in the beginning was to remove Afghanistan‘s Taliban regime, which 
had sheltered the terrorist organization al-Qaeda. Denmark, as a close ally to United States could 
not stand idle; after all, 9/11 was not only an attack on the United States, but also on freedom, 
democracy and the Western way of life. Since January 2002, Denmark contributed militarily to 
both Operation Enduring Freedom (the US military action against al-Qaeda) and NATO‘s 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Danish Parliament‘s (Folketinget) resolution 
regarding the invasion of Afghanistan stressed that the engagement in the country was based on 
combatting terrorism
18
:  
 
―Parliament communicates its consent that the Danish military forces made available to 
the US-led international efforts to combat terrorist networks in Afghanistan.‖ 
(Retsinformation, 2001a) 
 
The rhetoric by Danish ministers during this period, more or less replicated Bush‘s statements, 
conceiving the terrorist threat in a similar manner. Firstly, the Danish liberal government sought 
to cement that Danish security was a top-policy priority and that terrorism could threaten 
                                                 
18
 Denmark supported from the beginning the US invasion of Afghanistan, which not only denotes to the fact that 
terrorism posed a serious international threat, but should also be read in the context of Denmark leading an activist 
foreign policy since the 1990s, seeking to achieve greater international power and influence(Jakobsen, 2015; 
Jakobsen & Ringmose, 2015). One of main the principles behind this foreign policy was, that Denmark needed to 
align itself with the U.S. and Brits, not only because it was the ―right thing to do‖, but also because it would benefit 
Denmark in achieving her foreign political objectives, through our great allies and their superior military capacity 
(Rasmussen, 2011). 
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Denmark. For instance, at a 2003 parliament inquiry, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Per 
Stig Møller stated:  
 
―Terrorism constitutes a serious threat towards international peace and our security‖ 
(Møller, 2003a).  
 
Møller was in this instance articulating terrorism as an existential threat to Denmark as a referent 
object, which concerned the military sector of international peace and our security. Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen‘s first New Year‘s speech as Danish Prime Minister, touched upon the notion that 
9/11 was an attack on Western and Danish values, thus speaking of the threat in regards to the 
political sector: 
―The United States represents, what all religious fanatics and domineering tyrants fear 
and despise. American society is built on the ideas of personal freedom, democracy, 
human rights and religious tolerance. Throughout the Western world, we have built our 
societies upon corresponding values […] It is these values that we should cherish and 
defend‖ (Rasmussen, 2003)19.  
 
The threat perception was initially quite clear regarding global terrorism. It concerned concretely 
the lives of citizens
20
 in the West, and Western values. However, as the international coalition 
completed their initial objective of invading Afghanistan and removing the Taliban regime, the 
complex question arose: what was the long-term objective in Afghanistan? 
 
In 2005, NATO took over the central security responsibilities in Afghanistan. This was partly 
due to the American military having to respond to the civil war in Iraq, leaving the European 
coalition members with the main responsibility in Afghanistan. The American focus initially 
concerned ridding the country of the Taliban and affiliated terrorist groups. However, the 
Europeans did not only want to wage war, as noted by Rasmussen (2011:13), ―they wanted to 
                                                 
19
 The notion that terrorism, post-9/11, has become a primary Danish foreign political priority, is not per se a 
controversial statement; the securitization of the war on terror is well-established, and most scholars agree on this 
conviction (Vultee, 2010; Sinaga, 2014). Proving a successful securitization of terrorism is not as such a primary 
focus of this paper, hence I will not go into too much detail concerning extraordinary measures and the audience‘s 
accept regarding this subject.  
20
 Which the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London assisted in confirming. 
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wage the good war‖; a war that not only revolved around defeating the Taliban, but also entailed 
building a better, stable and peaceful Afghan society. In a Danish context this meant providing 
―the proper and secure environment for the political transition process, the relief effort and the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan‖ (Retsinformation, 2002). 
 
What constitutes a ―good war‖ is debatable, but there is little doubt that the characteristics of it 
are rooted in how Denmark previously understood its foreign political strategic objectives. From 
a social constructivist standpoint, it is important to keep in mind, what Denmark‘s foreign 
political identity and strategic culture has been tied to. To chart some of the major traits of 
Denmark‘s recent foreign policy: firstly, Denmark is a relatively young war faring nation in the 
modern era, secondly; Denmark‘s foreign political influence has predominantly happened 
through strong support and adherence to the UN, multilateral institutions and via Nordic 
partnerships, thirdly; development assistance and peacekeeping missions have governed foreign 
engagements and are considered her ―areas of expertise‖, while fourthly; as highlighted in 
Chapter 4, Denmark has since the 1990s promoted values of democracy, human rights and good 
governance (Jakobsen, 2014; Landmark, 2012).  
 
As such, the Danish basis for ―a good war‖ entails dimensions that are broader than military 
engagement. This is why Denmark stressed that the international engagement in Afghanistan had 
to be tied to UN resolutions. To paraphrase, the UN resolutions called the international 
community to assist the Afghan government in creating and maintaining security, to extend its 
authority throughout the country, to promote peace and stability in the region and globally, and 
contribute to improving the living conditions of the Afghan people (UN, 2001). Hence, the 
Danish criterion of ―success‖ in Afghanistan was not only tied to combatting terrorism, but also 
to the complex challenge of restoring peace, stability, and rebuilding Afghanistan. However, this 
was a difficult task considering the country had been at war for more than two decades. 
According to the United Nations Development Program, 70% of the country's citizens were 
undernourished with a life expectancy of 40, and the majority of the population was illiterate 
(DIIS, 2016: 31). In supplement to combatting the Taliban, the international coalition thus faced 
a major development challenge to pave the way for stability and peace.  
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Therefore, both developmental and military efforts were required in Afghanistan. The link 
between security and development is most commonly referred to as the security-development 
nexus in policy papers and by the academic community. In short, the nexus builds on the notion 
that the malaise of development, poverty and weak state capacity are interpreted by donors and 
international organizations, as themes that are sources to insecurity (Griffith, 1993; Duffield, 
2001: 37-39). In Appendix E I provide a review of this nexus and how it rose to prominence in 
the 1990s, whilst highlighting how Denmark has operated with this notion in combining civil and 
military efforts. 
5.3 A Transition from Terrorism to Underdevelopment as a Threat 
Since the 1990s, Denmark had the instruments of development and security combined in praxis. 
However, with the war on terror and Denmark‘s engagement in Afghanistan, the security-
development nexus became a central element in the rhetoric presented by the top-political 
hierarchies (Baell et al, 2006: 57). This was in part due to on-the-ground experiences in 
Afghanistan. Although the Taliban regime had fallen, their influence and power was still present. 
The international coalition began an extensive counter-insurgency warfare against armed Taliban 
insurgents, their al-Qaeda allies, and other terrorist networks. Yet, providing security in the 
entirety of Afghanistan, especially the rural areas, proved to be a major challenge during the war. 
As such, the Taliban were constantly able to destabilize and disrupt the progress made by the 
international coalition
21
. At the height of the war, approximately 100,000 foreign and 352,000 
Afghan soldiers and police were present in Afghanistan (DR, 2013), yet the Taliban‘s influence 
was still not suppressed. The generally accepted rule of thumb from counter-insurgency manuals 
stipulates a ratio of 20 soldiers per 1000 civilians should garner the ability to withhold a 
meaningful presence (British Defense, 2009: 1-2; Krause, 2007). With Afghanistan‘s population 
of approximately 30 million, this would have required a force of nearly 500,000 soldiers. 
However, the bulk of the presence consisted of Afghan forces whose capabilities were 
questionable, thereby undermining the military presence as a whole. The lack of military 
                                                 
21
 In a Danish context, this was most prominently witnessed with regard to the support of the education sector. 
Supporting education and the building of schools was one of Denmark‘s key areas of priority. The Taliban strongly 
opposed the building of new schools, firstly because it undermined their recruitment capabilities, and also due to the 
fact that the Taliban deprived girls above 8 years the right to education. As such, schools became an important 
symbolic battleground (Rasmussen, 2011: 77). 
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manpower in Afghanistan was one reason why the coalition sought to strategically re-think how 
the objectives with the engagement could be achieved. To this end, the international coalition, 
including Denmark, became aware of the necessity to combine civil and military efforts.  
 
The emphasis on civil-military efforts that emerged in the mid-2000s was in sync with the 
rhetoric of Danish ministers that increasingly began speaking of security and development in 
unison; ―Development assistance is an integrated part of Danish foreign security policy‖ (Møller, 
2003a). Interestingly though, it was not only the Minister of Foreign Affairs that addressed this 
issue. The Minister of Development, Bertel Haarder, more or less replicated Møller‘s statement; 
―Development cannot be achieved without security. Security cannot be achieved without 
development‖ (Haarder, 2004). It was not common that the Minister of Development addressed 
security concerns, but this changed with the liberal government during the period. 
 
Haarder and Møller were arguably the first to present, in a Danish foreign political context, that 
for Afghanistan‘s intervention to be successful would require an effort from the development 
assistance arena too. Danish ministers increasingly began speaking of development assistance as 
a viable tool for combatting terrorism; a point that was conveyed in 2003 by Per Stig Møller. He 
remarked: 
 
―Terror in both rich and poor countries has reminded us that a new foreign and security 
policy situation has arrived […] Development assistance should contribute in addressing 
the basis for radicalization and extremism […] In other words, development assistance 
can play a crucial role in addressing future threats‖ (Møller, 2003b) 
 
The emphasis on development assistance as a tool against terrorism unsurprisingly coincided 
with large amounts of ODAs being disbursed to Afghanistan during this period
22
. In 2004, 
international aid to Afghanistan and Iraq rose by USD 1.5 billion, and gross debt relief fell by 
USD 2.1 billion (OECD, 2005). During the height of the war, Afghanistan was the single largest 
recipient of Danish development assistance with nearly 3.8 billion DKK being dispersed between 
                                                 
22
 This was naturally also tied to the shifting nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime had fallen, and 
as the intensive military efforts of the initial invasion started to decline. 
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2001-2012 (MFA, 2012). As the graph below shows, Danish development assistance to 
Afghanistan began increasing from 2001, still continuing to rise.  
 
Figure 5: Danish Development Assistance to Afghanistan from 2012-2017 
 
Source: MFA, 2012 
 
Danish development assistance played a key role, partly in the reconstruction of the Afghan 
society but also due to the necessity of addressing the root-causes of terrorism, as noted by Ulla 
Tørnæs, Minister of Development in 2005:  
 
―Development policy is also used actively in the fight against extreme fundamentalism 
and terrorism. Here, development assistance can help combat some of the international 
terrorism's root causes. The new terror attempts deliberately to exploit poverty, social 
problems and political marginalization to build sympathy and secure a future 
recruitment―(Tørnæs, 2005) 
 
The root causes of terrorism were perceived as stemming from poverty, social problems, and 
political marginalization. In other words, underdevelopment was a key priority in Afghanistan.  
 
A shift in the rhetoric concerning the threat came in the way of attention broadening to 
underdevelopment as a whole, which was not exclusive to Afghanistan. Other regions and 
countries afflicted by similar conditions were now being discussed. This was reflected in aid 
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disbursement, with countries like Sudan and Somalia seeing an increase in aid during this period. 
In parallel, Denmark had increasingly been closing embassies since the new millennia with a 
goal to ―focus‖ Denmark‘s development assistance23. Large development programs in Zambia 
and Zimbabwe were for instance closed so countries that were more impactful on Danish 
security could be prioritized. 
 
The Danish government therefore not only focused on development assistance regarding its 
engagement in Afghanistan, but also thought of development assistance broadly in regards to 
security concerns. As Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated bluntly, ―for many years there has been a 
development socialist romance mixed into Danida's work.‖ (Politiken, 2005)24. Such a 
prioritization and focus was witnessed in Denmark‘s development engagement in Africa, where 
the security rationale increasingly became an object of reference. As noted by Tørnæs in 2005: 
 
―(Denmark) believes in the necessity of development as a precondition for security and 
stability […] As the poorest continent in the world, with more than its fair share of 
violent conflicts, I believe that Africa needs more attention than it gets.‖ (Tørnæs, 2005) 
 
The focus on Africa was not a priority exclusive to Denmark; Abrahamsen (2005) argued that 
Britain‘s rhetoric regarding Africa shifted from ―development/humanitarianism‖ towards a 
category of ―risk/fear/threat‖. As such, she argues that the New Labor government securitized 
Africa, speaking of it being a pressing security concern. Following Abrahamsen‘s thoughts, 
Tørnæs presented Africa in a similar fashion:  
 
―The active Danish profile in terms of aid opportunities to contribute to peace, security 
and stability - emphasizes that development assistance is an integral part of Danish 
                                                 
23
 It should be noted, that there also was a prioritization of development funds towards commercialization and 
business programs during this period. As such, the closing of these embassies should not only be read in the context 
of the security rationale, but also a foreign political interest to strengthen Denmark‘s private sector.  
24
 Paradoxically, with respect to Rasmussen‘s quote above, even when a new Social Democratic government was 
elected in 2011, the notion of the security-development nexus was actually carried over, hence not being a foreign 
political priority exclusive to the Danish Liberal government. Even the ―champion‖ of Danish development 
assistance, Christian Friis Bach, had changed his opinion regarding development‘s value towards ensuring peace and 
stability. "Earlier, I did not adhere to the belief, that security and development should be mixed. I believe the exact 
opposite today‖ (Politiken, 2014).  
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foreign policy […] war and conflict were some of the main reasons why it has been so 
difficult for Africa to rise out of poverty. Fast, coordinated and targeted development aid 
is often quite central in connection with conflict prevention.‖ (Tørnæs, 2005) 
 
The emphasis on security concerns stemming from Africa was likely due to observations of 
deteriorating situations in Somalia and Sudan during this period. For instance, the long civil war 
in Somalia gave rise to al-Shabaab emerging as a terrorist organization and piracy became an 
issue that affected commercial sea-passage in the Gulf of Aden.  
5.4 Fragile States as a Threat 
With these cases in mind (Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia), a trend has begun based on the 
observation that the countries all lacked the traditional characteristics of a well-functioning 
state
25
. To this end, the Western discourse in the mid-2000s started to present failed
26
 and fragile 
states as security concerns. The Blair administration was arguably the first to bring fragile states 
to the international security agenda noting, ―We know that poverty and instability lead to weak 
states which can become havens for terrorists and other criminals‖ (Blair, 2004). The U.S. soon 
followed suit, with Condoleezza Rice, former US Secretary of State stating: ―Weak and failing 
states serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of 
criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons.‖ (Rice, 
2005). The U.S. and Britain hence viewed state fragility as the crux of the terrorist threat. 
 
In Denmark, the focus on fragile states emerged when Søren Pind was Minister of Development 
in 2010. In his new agenda, he stated: 
 
                                                 
25
 E.g. lacking a centralized state apparatus; warlordism and clan structures dictated governance-mechanisms; they 
failed to deliver fundamental basic goods (e.g. security), and; the ruling circle benefited the most from the economic 
ventures in the countries. I will in the next chapter more thoroughly cover this topic.  
26
 Failed states can be defines as: ―If a government can‘t physically control its territory, has no, or only a limited, 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, cannot adopt and enforce decision binding for the whole country is unable 
to provide basic public services and cannot represent the whole country in the international community, that state is 
a failed state.‖ (Djavadi, 2009) 
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―Earlier we feared the strength of great powers such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union, today, paradoxically, we fear the most powerless states. Fragile states have a real 
bearing on regional security and even on our own security‖ (Pind, 2010b) 
 
Essentially, the attention towards fragile states in the mid-2000s broadened the threat perception 
to include states with similar characteristics; Afghanistan was no longer the sole object of 
attention. This is not to say that terrorism faded out as a perceived threat. This ―new‖ focus 
placed attention on how underdevelopment, in the form of weak state structures, was a root cause 
of terrorism and thus likewise posed a security concern. 
5.5 Sub-Conclusion  
Discursively over time, the perceived threat has shifted from terrorism to include 
underdevelopment and fragile states as well. Danish Ministers presented the threat in relation to 
the Danish state (military sector) and Danish values (political sector). This perception emerged 
due to several factors.  
 
Firstly, the changing nature of conflicts in the 1990s gave rise to the security-development nexus 
playing an important role in how the international community saw threats could derive from the 
Global South (See: Appendix E). Secondly, after Afghanistan‘s invasion the international 
coalition, including Denmark, became aware that the objective of combatting terrorism also 
required development assistance. Related, the complex criterion of ―success‖ in Afghanistan 
highlighted that the objective relied on development assistance to pave the way for peace and 
stability. Then, during the mid-2000s underdevelopment and fragile states were broadly 
beginning to be discussed as security concerns. It is probable that this conviction stemmed from 
observations in Afghanistan where underdevelopment was viewed as a driver of terrorism and 
that comparable characteristics would replicate in other parts of the world.  
 
However, examining these speech acts only provides part of the picture regarding the 
securitization process. As I will be highlighting in the next section, much of the ―security 
construction‖ happens through policy papers, which outline the measures that are appropriate in 
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dealing with these threats, thereby potentially giving these constructions real life consequences 
that not solely reside in the socially constructed and discursive domain.  
 
 
Chapter 6: Practice 
Good Governance’s Non-Discursive Enlistment in the Security Domain 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I explore, in a Danish context, how good governance from a non-discursive 
perspective has been enlisted in the security domain. 
As noted by Emmers (2004), ―a complete act of securitization really consists of and demands 
both discursive (speech act) and non-discursive (policy implementation) dimensions‖. This 
chapter is devoted to exploring the non-discursive dimensions. This was done through looking at 
the policy arena, which demonstrates explicitly how good governance has been enlisted in the 
security domain. As advocated by Balzacq, policy formulation serves as a gateway towards how 
securitizing actors tackle threats, or how security is constructed. I will argue that good 
governance‘s enlistment can be identified in three manners: 1) In the context of good governance 
and the narrow conception, this is witnessed in respect to state-building and the fragile states 
agenda; 2) In the context of good governance and the broad conception, which is tied to the 
objective of establishing democratization and human rights, and lastly; 3) with regards to the 
notion‘s role in a civil-military context. Each example of good governance‘s enlistment will be 
analyzed in this chapter, starting with the narrow conception and fragile states.  
6.2 Example One: Fragile States and the Narrow Conception 
USAID launched in 2005 its first official policy paper on fragile states. Countries like Australia, 
Canada, Britain and Denmark soon followed. The Danish fragile states policy paper, ‗Peace and 
Stabilization‘, notes that, ―practically all of them (fragile states) are afflicted by, or emerging 
from conflict‖ (MFA, 2010: 2). Moreover, it is mentioned that the conflicts inherent to these 
states pose a security threat, because:  
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“These are conflicts that spread instability to other countries and regions, and which in 
the worst case can become breeding grounds for global threats, as witnessed in Somalia 
and Afghanistan. Fragile states thus constitute one of the most significant challenges to 
peace and security in the world.‖ (ibid: 2) 
 
The threat perception is two-fold: conflicts can spread across borders, thus impacting regional 
security; and state fragility fosters terrorism, thus impacting international security
27
. As 
highlighted in the policy paper there are two dimensions to state fragility. Firstly, these states 
lack infrastructural capacity (Rotberg, 2002: 85), which refers to the effectiveness of state 
institutions in providing public goods to the society. This is expressed in the form of: 
 
―weak governmental structures, weak internal cohesion and a high degree of inequality, 
with massive challenges arising from extreme poverty, armed conflict and instability‖ 
(MFA, 2010: 2-3) 
 
As such, Denmark perceives fragile states epitomized by “bad” governance in the form of weak 
governmental structures, weak institutional capacity and corruption. Lacking infrastructural 
power has the consequence of potentially undermining a state‘s coercive capacity. This capacity 
concerns a state‘s ability to execute force with retention and maintain a monopoly on violence 
(Rotberg, 2002: 87). As mentioned in the policy paper: 
 
―Fragility can take many forms. It could be that a state has collapsed and cannot protect 
its population, or that it does not have the monopoly on legitimate use of force, and lacks 
the capacity to exercise authority vis-à-vis the factions – rebel groups, for example – that 
challenge that authority.‖ (MFA, 2010: 2).  
 
 
                                                 
27
 Within the IR discipline there has been a long academic tradition of assessing state strength and measuring 
military capabilities, which has been imperative in the threat assessment of rivaling great powers. However, with the 
fragile states literature interested is diverted to assessing state weakness, and which form of threat such 
characteristics pose. For a review of the fragile states literature and how the academic scene has approached this 
topic see Appendix F.   
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A state‘s lacking coercive capacity might lead to a contest of power, whereby terrorist 
organizations can contest the authority of fragile states. Providing security is arguably the most 
essential public good that a state must ensure to provide. 
 
The main issue regarding fragile states thus concerns the provision of public goods, undermined 
by two forms of weak capacity: infrastructural and coercive. In dealing with this fragility, 
Denmark sees State-Building as a key tool that can curb these lacking capacities. The policy 
paper defines state building as: 
 
―STATEBUILDING in fragile states is a long-term political process aiming at 
establishing a community with inclusive political processes, common norms and rules 
and stable, legitimate institutions that enjoy the trust of the population, and which can 
supply justice, security and basic services to all citizens and facilitate economic and 
social development. As an external actor, Denmark can help these local processes on 
their way by building up the capacity of central and local institutions.‖ (MFA, 2010: 10) 
 
Interestingly, this definition of state building emphasizes features associated with the narrow 
conception of good governance. The definition above highlights the importance of inclusive 
political processes and legitimate institutions that in essence relate to the North‘s notion of open 
access order societies. The definition also underscores the importance of coercive capacity, via 
the emphasis on institutions that can provide security and basic services. The focus on 
institutions and their capacity to provide public goods relates to the four components (identified 
in Section 4.3.1) of the World Bank‘s good governance agenda. It is therefore alluded that 
Denmark sees state building as a narrow good governance tool that can curb ―bad‖ governance 
as a threat
28
.  
 
                                                 
28
 The policy paper goes on to note, why the promotion of good governance, in relation to narrow facets is 
important. Firstly it notes that the rule of law is necessary via ―strengthening financial administration, and capacity 
building for supplying social services at local level‖, so as to curb corruption and the clientelism of limited access 
order societies (UM, 2010: 17). Political participation at all levels and ownership of the political processes, 
―generates support for peace processes‖ (ibid). For this reason, supporting the civil society and free and fair media 
are also listed as vital factors. The paper also mentions the importance of holding individuals accountable, namely in 
respect to crimes committed; ―Unresolved tensions, violations or a sense of injustice can lead to instability and new 
conflicts.‖ (ibid). 
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6.2.2 Implementing the Narrow Conception 
Looking at the concrete state building tasks in Afghanistan unveils a great deal concerning the 
implementation of the narrow good governance agenda. Creating infrastructural capacity was the 
primary task after the invasion of Afghanistan, 
 
―Regarding the discussion about what comes first, democratization or institutions. 
Definitely institutions. It was important for us to initially get the institutions in place […] 
Promoting governance is always ―good‖, but under these circumstances (Afghanistan), 
we could not afford to think of good governance from a traditional development 
perspective. As such, the ―good‖ governance (from a broad perspective) ambitions were 
not always the most important, but governance in its simplest form was highlighted. 
Firstly, with regard to institutions and thereafter on governance-processes.‖ (Kværnø, 
2016: 3-6) 
 
As noted by Holsti (1996), the first critical step in state building primarily focuses on the security 
apparatus and state institutions. Hence before good governance from the perspective of 
democracy and human rights could be implemented, creating an institutional foundation was 
necessary. Buzan (1991) conceptualizes the state and its basic elements according to three 
pillars: the idea of the state, the physical basis of the state, and the institutional expression of the 
state. The way in which Denmark and the international community could create the basis of a 
state in Afghanistan, was to support the institutional expression of the state through state-
building and implementing good governance from a narrow conception. It can be stated that the 
focus in volatile and very fragile states concerns the essentials of what governance entails, 
namely institutions and basic governance structures. 
 
The duties of my interviewees that were Chief Governance Planners for Regional Command 
South (ISAF) entailed creating basic structures of governance in regard to local governance 
structures and mechanisms (Kværnø, 2016: 3-10; Anonymous, 2016: 6-8).  
 
―On the ground in Helmand, good governance was practical governance, and entailed 
getting the local institutions to make decisions. It concerned the basics of political 
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science. Making decisions about the public goods of society and how these should be 
distributed, either in respect to the local tribal elders, at the local governor level, and in 
the various councils […] Hence, governance in Afghanistan entailed giving the local 
institutions decision-making competences‖ (Anonymous, 2016: 6-8) 
 
The tasks in Afghanistan also reflect that the primary task was to get basic structures in place, 
defined as effective governance. Moreover, the Afghan government lacked a military and police 
force capable of providing security in the country revealing the states‘ lack of coercive capacity. 
This lead to the capacity training of military and police officers becoming a central element in 
Afghanistan (MFA, 2015: 16). This has latterly become a central theme for the Danish fragile 
states‘ agenda as a whole29, where the capacity training of military and police forces is carried 
out in several countries (MFA, 2010: 15.   
 
The task on the ground is to establish institutional capacity, state legitimacy and accountability in 
its most basic forms. This often entails establishing the rule of law (by building legal institutions 
from scratch) and creating and training public administration that is capable of providing basic 
services
30
. The task might not be economically focused but it resembles the features that are 
associated with the narrow dimension. Moreover, with a focus on strengthening coercive 
capacity, military and police personnel are trained and equipped in fragile states; military force 
and security capabilities are as such created and enhanced. Therefore, introducing the good 
governance principals of ―capacity training‖ in fragile states has effects on security; in other 
words, security is constructed.  
 
In summary, good governance configures in security setting through implication and via a chain 
of equivalence. In short, this chain builds on the understanding that the state building task in 
fragile states, boils down to tasks which we associate with the narrow good governance agenda. 
Enhancing coercive and infrastructural capacity in fragile states is perceived as a central tool to 
curb the threat of terrorism.   
                                                 
29
 E.g. in Kenya, Denmark is engaged with the training of the country‘s navy, so as to control the waters of the Gulf 
of Aden and piracy from Somalia.  
30
 An example to this end, was the training of local elders in Afghanistan, so they were capable of carrying out the 
duties of local administrations. ―Express-courses‖ were made, where Afghans could achieve a political science 
degree within a few weeks (Anonymous, 2016: 19-21) 
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6.3 Example Two: The Broad Conception, Democracy and Legitimacy 
According to Article 1 regarding the Danish Defense Law (Forsvarsloven), ―The military 
defense shall help to promote peace and security‖ (Retsinformation, 2001b). The main purposes 
of Danish Defense are to, ―1) to prevent conflict and war; 2) to assert Danish sovereignty and 
ensure the country's continued existence and integrity, and; 3) to promote the peaceful 
development of the world with respect for human rights.‖ (ibid) 
 
It is legally stipulated that the purpose of Danish Defense is to contribute to a peaceful 
development based on human rights. As stated in the Danish Afghanistan Strategy 2008-2012, 
reaching such an objective required the following; 
 
―Consolidating democracy in Afghanistan by supporting the holding of free elections; 
Strengthening the public sector‘s ability to deliver results through promoting good 
governance at centralized and decentralized level; Enhancing the Afghan Government‘s 
ability to reach out to the population – both men and women – through the process of 
decentralizing tasks and powers from central to local level as well as strengthening 
capacity in all provinces; Strengthening respect for human rights in Afghanistan, in 
particular by supporting the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC); Improving women‘s access to the judicial system; Creating a strong and 
pluralistic civil society as an essential building block of a sustainable Afghan 
democracy―(MFA, 2008)  
 
These tasks resemble good governance from a broad conception, touching upon issues of human 
rights, public participation and democratization. This thematic area was stressed in the  necessity 
of formulating and supporting a new constitution, holding new elections and providing support 
for establishing new democratic institutions (ibid: 6). Human rights conditions were hard-pressed 
during this stage also. Particularly women experienced this as they faced discrimination in 
participating in the political processes (ibid: 8). In the most recent policy paper from Afghanistan 
spanning from 2014-2017 (MFA, 2014), ODA contributions amounted to a total of 1085 million 
DKK. Regarding the thematic program on good governance, democracy and human rights 317 
million DKK will be disbursed over a three-year period. 
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The focus on these elements was underpinned by an objective to create a legitimate state in the 
eye of the Afghan people. The emphasis was placed mainly on elections and the democratization 
processes, reflecting the goal of creating a legitimate Afghan government (MFA, 2008: 17). 
Based on the conviction that state failure stems from a lack of state legitimacy (Pegg, 1998), the 
objective in Afghanistan was to enforce the idea of the state
31
, which needed to be legitimately 
democratically bound. As stated by Buzan, ―without a widespread and quite deeply rooted idea 
of the state among the population, the state institutions themselves have difficulty functioning 
and surviving‖ (Buzan, 1991). State legitimacy is a vital component in state building, because 
without legitimacy, democratic authority is undermined (Holsti, 2004: 56-57). 
 
The international coalition was resolute on emphasizing these themes because the international 
mission as whole was based on defending these values (as reflected in Chapter 5). However, it 
was also viewed that the promotion of these values  - a legitimate and democratic Afghan 
government - was a necessary enabler towards peaceful development. As noted by Collier & 
Rohner (2008: 531), 
 
―The rationale for this strategy, over and above the intrinsic desirability of democracy, is 
that by making the government more accountable, citizens will have less cause for violent 
opposition‖  
 
By this token, on the basis of Denmark‘s foreign political identity and strategic culture (see 
Section 5.2), there is a liberal ideological
32
 rationale behind Denmark‘s intervention, which in 
essence equates legitimacy and democracy with peace. This notion of peace and democracies 
being correlated is referred to as democratic peace theory (Rosato, 2003; Doyle, 1986). 
Statistically, it has been demonstrated that democracies less frequently engage in war with one 
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 Arguably, this was one of the conceptual flaws with promoting good governance in Afghanistan, considering that 
the Afghan citizens to a higher degree associated themselves with local clan structures, which undermined the basis 
to form a democratic Afghan regime. 
32
 Kant‘s notion of perpetual peace is arguably the starting point for most liberal thinkers, which in essence concerns 
the idea, that peace, permanently can be established over a certain area. 
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another, while non-democracies are more inclined to do so
33
. The Clinton Doctrine is one of the 
more expressive examples of such a conviction. However, it appears that Denmark has too been 
influenced by this line of thought due to its emphasis on good governance from a broad 
conception, via the promotion of democracy and legitimacy in Afghanistan.  
 
Such a conviction, should also be interpreted in the light that the reason of going to war has 
altered in the post-Cold War era. The moral and legitimate justification of going to war was 
arguably simpler during this era; it was a war of existence and concerned state survival in its 
purest form. The collapse of the Soviet Union paved the way for a new way to use, threaten and 
legitimizing force. While Western use of force during the Cold War was essentially legitimized 
with reference to national security, the need to prevent (great power) war and to counter the 
spread of communism, the dominant rationale after the fall of the wall was the need to protect 
human rights and spread democracy and market economy. The Danish engagement concerning 
the civil war in Libya (2011) and the recent engagements in Mali (2015-) and Iraq/Syria (2014-) 
have in the contrary been labelled wars of choice, which are political projects that do not concern 
Danish survival. It is difficult to label the war in Afghanistan as either. Despite the discursive 
representation of terrorism, underdevelopment and fragile states as threats, the war necessitated 
some sort of political legitimacy that did not only rest upon Danish survival in its primal form. 
One way, in which this war was legitimated, was tying its reason to development. I will return to 
this point in Chapter 7 regarding good governance‘s legitimizing and contextual values.  
 
The promotion of good governance from a broad conception has been withheld in Danish foreign 
policy. In Chapter 4, concerning traditional development assistance, the promotion of good 
governance was seen as a value-based agenda and as a political project. Regarding the war in 
Afghanistan, good governance has been promoted in a similar manner because of its affiliation 
of representing certain democratic values. As such, good governance from the broad perspective 
has also been enlisted in the security domain: firstly because of the goal to create a democratic 
                                                 
33
 There are several explanations to this end, which the academic scene has highlighted: for instance, that 
democracies have the ability to get along without fighting, due to the fact, that democracies are legitimately elected, 
and thus deserves respect and trust; they are able to resolving political issues through comprimise; and that 
democracies have developed a wide array of interactions amongst another, and are thus interdependent on each other 
(Morgan, 2013: 35). 
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and legitimate Afghan government, which would pave the way for peace; but also because of the 
moral and political legitimacy it brings to the Danish domestic context.  
6.4 Example Three: Good Governance in a Military Context 
Up until now, I have in this chapter highlighted how good governance in a developmental setting 
has been enlisted in the security domain. This section takes this aspect one step further, 
demonstrating how good governance concretely is applied by the military. A brief introduction to 
good governance‘s role with regard to COIN is provided in Appendix G.  
 
6.4.1 Comprehensive Approach Strategies 
Denmark uses the term ‗samtænkningsstrategier‘, the Brits prefer the term ‗Whole of 
Government Approach‘, and NATO uses a Comprehensive Approach. These strategies build on 
a premise that integrated development of strategies, coordination, implementation and evaluation 
across ministries (and the military-civil sphere), better enables the West in achieving lasting 
democratic peace and build stable nations (Jakobsen, 2014). Comprehensive approach strategies 
are perceived in Danish policy papers, as a term which encompasses much more than just civil-
military coordination; in essence it is a stabilization effort, which also is designed to fulfill 
political and military objectives. As such, the comprehensive approach can be interpreted as the 
latest branch and tool in seeking to address the security-development nexus, whilst also being the 
epitome of a strategic instrument in achieving foreign political objectives.   
 
In a Danish context, the comprehensive approach was formally introduced in the Defense 
Agreement of 2005-2009, with reference to the engagement in Afghanistan. Up to 750 Danish 
troops, including combat and transport aircraft, infantry, tanks, special operations forces, and 
others were present in Afghanistan. Additionally, several diplomats, technical assistants, and a 
defense attaché were attached to the Danish Embassy in Kabul.  
 
One of the results from the Defense Agreement was the establishment of a steering committee 
comprised of the State Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and 
the Ministry of Justice. The steering committee serves as the main coordinating forum, wherein 
the strategic level of planning across ministries is discussed. Moreover, The Peace and 
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Stabilization Fund (PSF) was established under the 2010-2014 Danish Defense Agreement, 
allocating 941 million DKK between 2010 and 2014. Half of this funding is considered official 
development assistance (ODA), while the other half is non-ODA resources from the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As noted, the PSF serves, ―as a cross-
government funding pool to support stabilization and conflict prevention initiatives at the nexus 
of security and development‖ (MFA, 2013: 24), thus directly addressing the nexus between 
security and development.  
 
There has been a comprehensive coordination on the top-political and strategic levels, which the 
steering committee and the PSF for instance are indicative of. When looking at the Danish policy 
for comprehensive approach strategies, good governance is listed herein. Firstly, good 
governance is listed in accord with the narrow dimension, touching upon the elements from a 
state-building and stabilization effort, thus replicating many of the same themes from the failed 
states agenda (MFA, 2013). Capacity building in the way of institutions is for instance listed as 
priority area (ibid: 4); ―capacity and institution building is the key to long-term stability‖ (ibid: 
35). Moreover, the comprehensive approach strategy policy paper also enlists good governance 
according to the broad agenda, touching upon elements of legitimacy, democracy and human 
rights (ibid). For instance, the promotion of human rights according to the Right to a Better Life 
is mentioned in the policy paper as a key priority (ibid: 39).  
 
Nevertheless, the Danish comprehensive approach strategy does not bring anything new in the 
way of thinking about good governance in the policy arena; focus is still on the narrow state-
building agenda and broad conception according to traditional standards of development 
assistance. However, the comprehensive approach is arguably the most profound example of 
how good governance has been brought into the security domain, which comes to show 
regarding on-the-ground thinking in Afghanistan.  
 
At the tactical level, civilian stabilization advisers were attached to the PRT‘s  in the Afghan 
provinces Badakhshan and Helmand. A PRT is a unit composed of military officers, diplomats, 
and reconstruction advisers and experts. Their main task is to support reconstruction efforts and 
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are a further development of the CIMIC
34
 teams introduced in the 1990s. The PRT was first 
introduced by the Brits and the U.S. in Iraq, with Denmark likewise supporting the NATO 
coalitions PRTs.  According to the Danish Ministry of Defense, their main task is to:  
 
―coordinate the international stabilization efforts and assist the Afghan government in 
expanding its exercise of authority and legitimacy in Helmand province. The objective is 
to create a local management that will help to improve the security situation and to ensure 
that the Afghans themselves can manage governance, economic development and 
delivery of service.‖ (Danish Defense, 2014).  
 
As such, one of the main purposes with the PRT is to empower local governments to govern their 
constituents more effectively. The emphasis on local authority and legitimacy relates to how 
COIN manuals stressed the importance of legitimacy deriving from the indigenous population.  
 
However, it can be questioned whether good governance has been able to fulfill a military duty 
on the tactical level and on the ground in for instance Afghanistan. Comprehensive approaches 
have met critique due to a disparity between means and ends, while there also has been 
incongruence between the tactical and strategic levels (Jakobsen, 2014). The PRT configuration 
appeared viable on paper, but this was not always the case in real terms. One particular example 
of this was how the military (and not the special stabilization advisers) increasingly had to carry 
out the good governance tasks on the ground, which they were not properly equipped to do. As 
such, we might say there has been a counter-effect of securitization, namely a 
developmentalization of the military. 
6.4.2 The Developmentalization of the Military? 
In respect to the good governance centered tasks, it was civilian stabilization advisers and 
experts (mainly from the Danish embassy in Kabul) that needed to carry out these 
responsibilities in Afghanistan. However, one of the repercussions of working in a volatile 
milieu, is that it might not always be possible to get these advisers into the field. Thus, in 
instances when the security was deemed too dangerous, officers and individuals with a military 
                                                 
34
 See Appendix E for an introduction to CIMIC. 
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background were sent to carry out the good governance tasks. This entailed sending out CIMIC 
officers
35
 that were not equipped to carry out stabilization tasks at local levels.  
 
―In situations where the civilians could not get out into the field, the task was moved over 
to the military. And the military is simply not good at that. We are not good at solving 
these tasks, because our focus is on safety above else. And we saw numerous examples, 
when stabilization advisers from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, could not get 
out of the camps, due to the  security situation, hence they asked the military CIMIC 
officers and junior officers to perform their duties. This created a confusion of 
responsibility regarding the rollout of stabilization projects. Military personnel are per 
definition not good at doing development in respect to good governance. Yes, they can 
dig wells, build schools and so on. But the complex process planning associated with 
good governance is something completely different. In essence, we took on some roles 
that we were not equipped to carry out.‖(Kværnø, 2016: 25-30) 
 
The situation of Danish military officers then needing to carry out civilian tasks subsequently 
arose. This is one example of the implications of combining the civil-military efforts. Until now, 
I have touched upon the consequences that security has had in development, but this example 
shows the contra-effect, where development is imposed on security. Nonetheless, it serves as one 
of the more vivid examples of how good governance has been enlisted in the security domain, 
namely in respect to how the military is assigned to carry out good governance tasks.  
 
Generally speaking though, the war in Afghanistan provides various examples of how the 
military increasingly became aware of good governance‘s necessity, mainly because it was 
perceived as a vital tool which garnered stability. An example to this end is witnessed in respect 
to how military operations started to incorporate governance into its planning of operations and 
its institutional configuration. Firstly, Chief Governance Planners were placed within the military 
institutions, typically with a civilian background, but whom had worked for instance with the 
                                                 
35
 Essentially, a CIMIC officer serves as the military commander‘s capability of reaching out to the locals, a military 
friendly face to the public one might say. This helps in establishing the needs of the locals, whether this may be in 
relation to building wells or addressing certain grievances, moreover it is also a vital source of gathering the 
necessary intel on the ground. Thus, the CIMIC officer‘s mindset is strictly according to military necessity, and not 
development oriented for the long run.  
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Ministry of Defense. It was necessary to have individuals, whom could carry out governance 
tasks, but also ―spoke the military language‖, and knew how to attune the governance task, so it 
could fit in with the complex planning of a military operation.  
 
―Given that, at the time, the military planning was the main driver of everything in 
Afghanistan, then you need someone whom can speak that language. That is, you need 
someone who can speak with the civil component and translate into military planning.‖ 
(Anonymous, 2016: 30) 
 
The international coalition‘s clear-hold-build strategy, which entailed clearing an area where the 
Taliban were present, hold the position, so lastly development could take place (build), was not 
initially very successful. This was primarily due to a void of power and leadership, which 
followed the clear phase, hence after a period of time the Taliban, would reemerge. As a 
consequence the military brought in good governance advisers several months before the military 
operation, so as to identify potential new political figures and train and equip new government 
officials; hence these could fill the power vacuum after operations (Anonymous, 2016: 14-17).    
 
These are but a few examples of the military engagement in Afghanistan incorporating good 
governance into its planning. It was mainly denoted in the realization that security could not be 
achieved without stability, and that stability rested upon governance structures.  
6.5 Sub Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted good governance‘s enlistment in the security domain in three 
interlinked manners. Firstly, good governance from a narrow perspective has been a cornerstone 
to the formulation of the fragile states agenda. Good governance is viewed as a measure that is 
capable of curbing deficits of ―bad‖ governance, which underpin the weak infrastructural and 
coercive capacity of fragile states. Secondly, promoting good governance from the broad and 
crosscutting perspective was a key objective in Afghanistan. This is denoted in the conviction 
that state legitimacy, from a democratic perspective, paves the way for peace and stability; an 
agenda that has ties to a foreign interventionist liberal mindset. Lastly, the merging of civil and 
military dimensions, prominently expressed by comprehensive approaches, has directly brought 
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good governance into a security domain with the military being tasked in carrying out 
governance tasks. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that an exclusive focus on speech acts does not provide the full 
picture. Policy papers serve as important gateways to comprehensively understand the scope of 
the security concern and how security is constructed. The incorporation of good governance in 
the policy setting has brought about real security effects in practice. Enhancing the coercive 
capacity of fragile states has led to the military and police personnel being better equipped and 
more capable in their conduct via training. There has also been a counter-effect of incorporating 
good governance in a civil-military setting where development has been constructed, due to the 
military‘s increased awareness of good governance and how these actors increasingly carried out 
its tasks.  
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Chapter 7: Concluding Discussion 
Stage Two: Extraordinary Measures and the Audience’s Accept 
7.1 Introduction   
This chapter sets out to discuss if good governance has been successfully securitized in a Danish 
context? 
 
I will discuss the traits of a successful securitization from the positions of the Copenhagen 
School and the sociological approach represtented by Balzacq and Floyd. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, identifying a successful securitization entails examining extraordinary measures and 
the audience‘s accept (Emmers, 2013: 132-136). I will reflect on whether good governance‘s 
enlistment in the security domain categorizes as extraordinary measures. Moreover, I will 
examine good governance‘s role regarding the audience‘s accept of the threats.  
7.2 Extraordinary Measures 
As highlighted in the chapter on theory, extraordinary measures refer to special privileges in 
dealing with a threat, outside the realm of ordinary politics. Nonetheless, the Copenhagen School 
does not clarify how these are identified, apart from the most controversial circumstance, where 
extraordinary measures come in the form of curtailing civil liberties, imposing martial law, 
political opponents and terrorists are detained without proper trial, or military budgets are 
increased (Anthony et al., 2006)
36
. Arguably, Denmark‘s invasion of Afghanistan portrays some 
sort of exception. This is because Denmark has never actively engaged in a war on such a scale, 
quickly supporting the invasion (expressing urgency).  The ‗Anti-Terror Package‘ was approved 
in 2002 by the Danish parliament and involved a comprehensive review of the legislation on 
terrorism. This was furthermore followed by a large increase in funding for the police and the 
Danish Military Intelligence Service (Retsinformation, 2002). Prior to 2002, terrorism had been 
under the jurisdiction of the Danish Police and Justice System. Currently it is the Danish Defense 
Ministry that steers groups on this matter.  
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 To this end, the Copenhagen School advocate for a desecuritization, which brings the issue back into the 
politicized sphere, where it is dealt within the standards boundaries of politics. 
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The Danish extraordinary measures are less apparent when compared to the American context. 
The Patriot Act of 2001 introduced unlawful combatant status. This would eliminate protection 
by the Geneva Conventions; enhance interrogation techniques, NSA electronic surveillance 
programs, and prisoner status at Guantanamo Bay (Abraham, 2007). Arguing that measures, 
according to these ―exceptional‖ characteristics can be identified regarding underdevelopment 
and fragile states as threats, would stretch the term as developed by the Copenhagen School. 
Comprehensive approach strategies are a new phenomenon within Danish foreign policy and 
have more or less brought development into a military context. However, these strategies do not 
portray exceptionality from a Schmittian perspective. 
 
Many scholars have taken issue with the term ‗extraordinary measures‘ and the Copenhagen 
School‘s position that it constitutes a successful securitization, because in liberal democracies 
―securitizing actors do not always revert to exceptional security when they address a threat‖ 
(Floyd, 2015: 5). The Copenhagen School has also reverted on this position (Floyd, 2015: 2), 
claiming that, ―we do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be 
adopted‖ (Buzan et al, 1998: 25). As noted in Section 3.4.3, on the basis of the constructivist 
deficit identified by Ciută (2009), Floyd (2015) rather sees it necessary to examine security 
practitioners as the key actor in defining extraordinary measures.   
 
Based on Floyd‘s criteria, it becomes clearer how good governance, via the policy arena, 
configures as a measure towards underdevelopment and fragile states as security threats. 
Government officials and civil servants have formulated the policy papers on the basis of what 
politicians have demanded, but it must also be expected, that they have influenced the policy 
formulation. Important, is the necessity to recognize, that they have been the main actors in 
identifying the response. It is no coincidence that good governance has been selected, by these 
security practitioners, as the proper measure; within the Danish MFA, good governance has been 
applied since the 1990s in dealing with underdevelopment, wherefore it is only natural, that this 
tool was the preferred measure from the practitioner‘s perspective. This was also expressed in 
my interview with Berg (2016: 11) :  
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―If you do not introduce good governance and democratic principles, conflict will entail‖ 
(Berg, 2016: 11) 
 
The conviction that underdevelopment and fragile states pose a threat is not only seen in the 
discursive arena; it is also shared by the Danish Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The 
security practitioners have seen good governance as the measure in dealing with this threat, 
which good governance‘s enlistment in the security domain is indicative of. In summary, it can 
be stated that good governance has served as measure in dealing with underdevelopment and 
fragile states as threats, because the practitioners have regarded it to be the appropriate measure. 
 
7.3 The Audience’s Accept 
The last step in a securitization analysis revolves around the audience‘s accept. The Copenhagen 
School argues that the discourse regarding the existential threat towards a referent object has to 
be articulated so it convinces the audience. As previously highlighted, this is notoriously difficult 
on general and public levels, where even public polls lack the necessary depth. However, there 
are a few indicators that we can draw upon; breaking it into two categories might be useful in 
this regard, looking at the security and development dimensions separately. 
 
Firstly, Danish public support towards the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan shifted 
throughout the 2000s (Jørgensen, 2011), but had frequently been more positive compared to 
European allies (Jakobsen & Ringsmose, 2015). Even after 10 years of engagement in 
Afghanistan, there was still a dominant public support towards the Danish efforts in this regard; 
indicating that some level of legitimacy in the public eye was maintained throughout (Schøtt, 
2013). Jakobsen (2015), from the Danish Defense College, argues that there has been an atypical 
acceptance and Danish support towards these wars, despite the losses within them. Despite the 
losses, broad parliamentary and public support remained. These factors could arguably portray a 
public consent towards the security dimensions. 
 
In terms of development, the Danish public support towards aid assistance signifies if there is  
public consent towards development assistance‘s usage. To this end, it is quite evident that 
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Denmark has consistently prioritized aid assistance. Danish aid contributions are rather high, 
when measured in GNI, and have been maintained above the 0.7% United Nations recommended 
threshold (Klarskov & Thobo-Carlsen, 2015)
37
. These aspects indicate that the public supports 
development assistance broadly, viewing this field as an important policy-priority.  
 
However, a successful securitization cannot be completed without the political elite‘s consent, 
because these actors are vital to granting the employment of extraordinary measures (Emmers, 
2013: 140; Roe, 2008: 615). One of the indicators that the political elite accepted terrorism as a 
threat was when the Danish parliament approved both the war in Afghanistan and the ‗Anti-
Terror Package‘ (Retsinformation, 2002). 
 
But the parliamentary acceptance of terrorism as a threat and the general public‘s acceptance of 
Denmark‘s military and development engagements tell us little about underdevelopment and 
fragile states being accepted threats. A major pitfall of the Copenhagen School‘s use of the 
audience‘s acceptance is that there are no stipulated guidelines to assess how and when it is 
identified. Therefore, scholars might reach different conclusions regarding successful 
securitization, resembling the abovementioned constructivist deficit. Moreover, good governance 
as a measure, did not require the acceptance from the audience because it already existed as a 
―non-exceptional‖ measure in dealing with development assistance.  
 
Because of this ambiguity, the far more interesting task, is trying to identify, which ―buttons‖ the 
securitizing actors have pushed in their pursuit of gaining the audience‘s accept. As argued by 
Balzacq, for the audience to accept the threat and measure in response, a certain context is 
necessary for this consent to happen. In this vein, the audience is only likely to accept a speech 
act, when feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions are evoked, based on the audience‘s 
preconceptions surrounding the referent object and the threat as such (ibid: 175), or as Balzacq 
notes, ―the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience‘s experience‖ (ibid: 184).  
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 The most recent cutbacks regarding Danish development assistance, garnered less than 50% support (Kaasgaard, 
2015). 
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Good governance has played a key role from such a contextual perspective. Denmark has been 
applying the concept since the 1990s promoted good governance, primarily from a broad 
perspective, which has been interpreted as a value-based agenda associated with themes of 
human rights and democracy. Danish politicians and the general population have thus had a 
preconception of what the concept entailed, it is thus no coincidence, that good governance has 
been articulated by the securitizing actors, when addressing the security concern. Reverting to 
Møller‘s representation of the terrorist threat, we actually witness good governance being 
mentioned alongside human rights and democracy:  
 
―The poorest (in this world) will face difficult and worse conditions, if terrorist groups 
manage to collapse already fragile states. For this reason we will be supporting 
development, the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance‖ (Møller, 
2003a). 
 
Likewise, when Søren Pind ushered in the fragile states agenda, he similarly relied on good 
governance, democracy and human rights in his speech acts:  
 
―The rationale regarding the engagement in fragile states is based on security as well as 
the moral obligation. Everyone has the right to live in freedom, wherefore the promotion 
of good governance, democracy and human rights is necessary‖ (Pind, 2010c) 
 
To legitimize Denmark‘s efforts against the threat, Danish ministers (as securitizing actors) have 
relied on good governance‘s contextual meaning, which represents Western values, evoking the 
audience‘s preconceptions concerning this subject. In other words, the securitizing actors have in 
this instance tuned their language by using the term good governance, so as to legitimize the 
threat and the measures in response. As such, it appears that Danish ministers have based their 
justification of dealing with a threat, which goes beyond the military rationale.  
 
This is also tied to the notion that wars in the post-Cold War era needing a political legitimacy 
behind them. A war of choice, which is not bound to our existence as a nation, configures 
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equally with any other domestic Danish political projects (Rasmussen, 2011:12). This point is 
captured from an excerpt of my interview with Kværnø, when he notes that: 
 
―When the war is a political project, legitimacy is needed, like all other political projects. 
Denmark‘s wars of choice vs. the car toll/ payment ring around Copenhagen - there is no 
difference between the two political projects. This means that the Danish government 
needs to provide political legitimacy, to explain to voters what we do and why we do it. 
In the Cold War, there was no need to explain how or why. Now we go to war on a wide 
scale of violence, ranging from hyper intensive violence attacks to peacekeeping 
operations. In respect to stabilization efforts, governance becomes an important part of 
the legitimacy of trying to buy support for this political project.‖(Kværnø, 2016: 12-13) 
 
It makes perfect sense to incorporate good governance into the legitimization because it serves as 
an emblem of the Western democratic state, and the stability associated with it. Earlier I 
mentioned the notion of developmentalization with respect to contra-effects on the military at the 
tactical and practical level, but the concept‘s effects can also be traced in a broader context. 
Kühn (2008: 1) uses the term and states that ―a developmentalization of security has taken place, 
as a certain – not specified – level of societal stability, welfare state and individual (e.g. 
economic) opportunity structures have become a benchmark for security policy‖. In the case of 
good governance and the security domain, this argument is too strengthened. Good governance‘s 
promotion in fragile states and in Afghanistan is a cornerstone that has become a benchmark for 
the security objective. Kühn goes on to note that, 
 
―Corresponding to the concept of securitization as a speech act, developmentaliization is 
assumed to be produced in the same way. On the background of a liberal-democratic 
mindset, Western policy makers can easily draw on their audiences‘ understanding of 
how state, society, economic system, political procedures and fundamental freedoms 
ought to look like in an ideal case.‖ (ibid: 2) 
 
Good governance represents and encompasses exactly these dimensions of how a state, society, 
economic system, political procedures and fundamental freedoms ought to look in an ideal case. 
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It is thus only natural that the securitizing actors have relied on good governance in their 
discourse. It is quite clear that ―good governance‖ has served as a button that the securitizing 
actors have pushed to evoke feelings and thoughts about a peaceful, stable and democratic world.  
 
Good governance‘s significance in a security setting is exposed, when the chain of equivalence 
as a whole is illuminated. To summarize, this chain if tied to good governance‘s enlistment in the 
security domain, which has occurred on two levels: 1) as a means, good governance is seen as 
tool in dealing with the threats of underdevelopment, fragile states and the root-causes of 
terrorism; and 2) as an end, good governance symbolizes the Western state ideal, and states that 
live up to such characteristics, are perceived as to ensure global peace and prosperity.  
 
7.4 Towards a Conclusion 
 
This Master Thesis set out to answer the question: How has the good governance agenda been 
linked to security and has good governance been securitized? Moreover, if such a 
securitization can be confirmed, how has this taken place discursively and in practice? 
 
The answer to this problem formulation is contingent on one‘s view of how a securitization 
analysis is conducted. It is quite evident that the purpose with applying good governance has 
shifted in a Danish context, from solely being related to development assistance, to 
contemporarily also being used in a security setting. However, whilst I argue that good 
governance has been enlisted in the security domain, this does not portray a securitization alone.  
 
From a Copenhagen School perspective, this case lacks exceptionality in the form of 
extraordinary measures deployed in dealing with underdevelopment and fragile states as a threat, 
and the audience‘s accept on this matter is difficult to identify. To this end, the simple answer is: 
no – good governance has not been securitized.  
 
However, this paper has demonstrated that by adopting supplementary angles to securitization, 
through an adherence to Balzacq‘s emphasis on power, context and practices, puts the case of 
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good governance‘s securitization in a different light. Firstly, policy papers serve as important 
objects of analysis in unveiling how good governance has been enlisted in a security setting. 
Discourse in the form of speech acts might bring security issues to the public attention, but they 
only go half the way in explaining the configuration of a threat. Policy papers unveil a chain of 
equivalence
38
, which highlight how good governance by implication configures in a security 
setting. Moreover, these documents affect the construction of security, expressed by how good 
governance‘s enlistment herein has real effects on practices within the security domain (e.g. 
strengthening coercive capacity and developmentalization). On the basis that security 
practitioners define the appropriate measures (e.g. good governance as measure in dealing with 
fragile states), unveils that the power tied to the securitization process, not only resides at the 
top-political hierarchies, but also at the bureaucratic administrative levels. The context is 
important in this regard because these practitioners have operated with good governance 
previously, in a development assistance setting. Considering that the issue of addressing the root-
causes of the threat primarily was a developmental task, the practitioners saw value in carrying 
this agenda over to the security domain as well. Good governance as a measure has been applied 
since the 1990s in a development assistance context, and lacks ―exceptional‖ characteristics, 
wherefore there has been little reason for the audience to object its deployment in a security 
setting; as such these factors negate the necessity of identifying the audience‘s accept. However, 
the term itself has played a role in a contextual sense, whereby its utterance has assisted in 
legitimizing the efforts against the threat.   
 
This thesis has thus demonstrated that the securitization process likewise takes place in the non-
discursive domain, whereby it is an intersubjective process. On the basis of examining: 1) the 
security practitioner‘s role; 2) non-exceptional measures, and; 3) the context behind the 
audience‘s accept - it is necessary to consider the sociological approach in the case of good 
governance‘s securitization. From this perspective it can be concluded that: yes - a 
securitization of good governance has taken place.  
 
                                                 
38
 The chain can be broken down into the following steps: terrorism  security-development nexus/ civil military 
cooperation  underdevelopment  fragile states  state building  good governance.  
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In relation to the global scope of this study, let us look at the question: of what is good 
governance‘s securitization a case? The case highlights how patterns have formed in the 
understanding of security and development as intertwined, expressed by an effort to combine 
civil and military dimensions. At the theoretical level, this thesis has demonstrated that a 
securitization takes place beyond the discursive domain and that the construction of security via 
policy papers has real effects on practices and security issues. Moreover, this case serves as an 
example of how Western policy security formulators do not merely conceive security in relation 
to military force and objective threats, as advocated by the traditional school of security studies. 
There is awareness amongst these actors, that the root-causes of security concerns in the Global 
South are driven by e.g. the malaise of development and governance deficiencies. To address the 
underpinnings of these security issues, the Global North views non-traditional security measures 
(e.g. good governance) as the appropriate and most effective means in dealing with these ―new‖ 
threats in the post-Cold War. As such, at the general and abstract level, the securitization of 
good governance thus serves as an example of how the conception of ―security‖ itself has 
broadened. Revisiting the Case Analytical Matrix from Section 2.4, following observations, 
concepts, patterns and theories can be plotted into the matrix.   
Figure 6: Analytical Matrix Revisited 
 Concrete Abstract 
Specific - Terrorism as a Threat 
- Underdevelopment and Fragile 
States as Threats 
- War in Afghanistan 
- War on Terror 
- Good Governance 
General - Security-Development Nexus 
- Civil-Military Cooperation 
- Securitization 
- Broadening of Security and 
Development‘s ―New‖ Role in the 
Security Domain 
 
Moreover, it appears that this study is relevant with respect to contemporary discussions 
concerning Danish foreign policy. Several reports have been issued this year related to this 
research area. In June, a synthesis of lessons learned regarding the Danish Comprehensive 
Approach in Afghanistan 2001-2014 was released. The report underlines several aspects that 
Denmark could have done ―better‖ including: the necessity of considering the local context 
regarding implementing good governance and state-building in fragile states, and whether these 
states have the capacity of adopting complex ―modern‖ institutional structures (DIIS, 2016). 
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Norway has also released a similar report this year, where a main conclusion recommended that 
Norway should steer away from state building and stabilization tasks in its future foreign 
political endeavors.  
 
This does not seem to be the case for future Danish foreign policy. After the 2015 Danish general 
elections, the newly elected liberal government appointed the former Danish ambassador to 
Washington, Peter Taksøe-Jensen, to investigate the strategic framework and outline the core 
purpose of Danish foreign policy. Taksøe-Jensen‘s report was released in May 2016, which, to 
paraphrase, highlighted the necessity of an interest-based approach to Danish foreign policy. The 
effects of this approach imply that development policy requires a logic and purpose beyond 
development, coming to resemble ―normal‖ foreign policy. The report suggests a focus on fragile 
states, strengthening of civil-military cooperation, and the necessity of enhancing comprehensive 
approach thinking at the tactical levels; factors, which are indicative of a persistent focus on the 
merging of security and development (Taksøe-Jensen, 2016).  
 
The Danish Foreign Minister, Kristian Jensen, in his expanded synopsis regarding the future of 
Danish development strategy lifted the veil on good governance‘s role in the future. Regarding 
the UN‘s Global Goals for 2030, Jensen sees Goal 16 as the premise for the future of Danish 
development. Goal 16 concerns the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development, providing access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels (MFA, 2016). Andersen (2016) notes that Goal 16 came as a ―reaction to 
the old 2015 targets and their lack of insight regarding the importance and connection between 
good governance and violent conflict‖. To this end, it is quite evident that Denmark will continue 
to prioritize good governance in her new interest-based foreign policy. 
 
Denmark‘s foreign political objective of bringing good governance in to the security domain, and 
addressing the security-development nexus, is a relatively new phenomenon in Denmark‘s 
foreign policy. However, the merging of security and development instruments is not a new 
phenomenon. Major players have long considered development‘s role in achieving security 
objectives. This had for instance been one the rationales and main pillars of development during 
the Cold War, arguably it even traces further back considering COIN objectives in the colonial 
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era. As such, the Danish securitization of good governance serves as an example of Denmark‘s 
foreign policy maturing and the quest to become on par with what the great international players 
are doing within this field.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Philosophy of Science 
Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge, the rationality of belief, and justification 
(Stroud 2011: 495). Constructivism, as a way of looking at epistemology, views all of our 
knowledge as constructed, because it is reliant on convention, human perception and social 
experience (Campbell, 2014: 377). For instance, a constructivist would posit, that the 
international system does not objectively exist (in contrast to e.g. the solar system), but only 
exists as an inter-subjective awareness among people (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 162). By this 
token, (social) constructivists argue that knowledge and reality are actively created by social 
relationships and interactions (Bryman, 2012: 33). The constructivist approach stands in contrast 
to objectivism, which argues that social phenomena and their meanings are not influenced by 
social actors, whereby these phenomena in essence are seen as external facts that are beyond the 
influence of social actors (ibid). Within IR, the traditional schools (e.g. realism) have typically 
represented an objective understanding of social phenomena, mainly because they view the 
international system as anarchical and structurally binding.  
Securitization theory is predominantly labeled as a constructivist approach to understanding 
security, because it emphasizes how discourses, which rely on ―security language‖, can bring 
about security concerns. Nevertheless, one of the main criteria of the Copenhagen School‘s 
approach, underscores that securitization must entail the ―survival‖ of a referent object, because 
if anything can become matters of security, then nothing in the end signifies security. This was a 
deliberate criteria set up by the CS approach, which resonated with the traditional schools of 
security studies. To this end, securitization falls somewhere in between a constructivist and 
realist approach to understanding security, which also is tied to the notion that the effects of 
securitization have ‗real‘ life implications.  
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Appendix B: Interviewees 
My interviewees were: 
- Anonymous: Chief Governance Planner, Afghanistan ISAF, 2010. Currently with the 
Danish Ministry of Defense. 
Date of interview: 14/04/2016 
- Nina Berg: Chief Adviser, Security and Stabilization Team, Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Works with reviews, appraisals and quality insurance of Danida programs. Has 
worked with rule of law and democratic governance as a former employee at UNDP. 
Date of interview: 04/05/2016 
- Ole Kværnø: Chief Governance Planner, Afghanistan ISAF, 2010. Currently the Dean at 
the Danish Defense College – was recently involved in issuing the lessons-learned report 
concerning the Danish engagement in Afghanistan (DIIS, 2016) 
Date of interview: 11/05/2016 
- Peter Marinus Jensen: Director, International Development Partners. As a consultant he 
has carried out several appraisals and reviews of Danish good governance programs. 
Date of interview: 28/04/2016 
- Thomas Juel Thomsen: Team leader, Global Development Issues, Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2010-2013. Has worked with the formulation of Danida‘s aid 
management guidelines. Currently self-employed as a consultant to the MFA. 
Date of interview: 07/04/2016 
- Torben Lindqvist: Chief Adviser, Technical Advisory Services, Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Chief adviser on good governance and public financial management. 
Date of interview: 29/04/2016 
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Appendix C: Policy Papers 
Regarding good governance from a development assistance perspective I relied on the following 
policy papers: 
- Human Rights and Democracy (1993) 
- En Verden I Udvikling: Strategy 2000 (1994) 
- Poverty (1996) 
- Partnership 2000 (2001) 
- En Verden til Forskel (2003) 
- The Right to a Better Life (2012) 
When it came to examining good governance‘s role and importance regarding the security 
domain, I studied a broad range of policy papers since 2001 issued by the Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. The Helman Plans and the specific program 
documents regarding Denmark‘s engagement in Afghanistan were important documents in my 
research, but ultimately I did not include these in the thesis, considering, that the broader policy 
papers captured the most essential aspects of promoting good governance in the country. The 
primary policy papers that I relied on, which tackled good governance‘s role in a security setting, 
vis-à-vis the security-development nexus and civil-military cooperation were: 
- Security, Growth – Development (2004) 
- The Afghanistan-Denmark Partnership (2005) 
- The Danish Afghanistan Strategy 2008-2012 (2008) 
- The Danish Afghanistan Strategy 2015-2017 (2015) 
- Peace and Stabilization: Denmark‘s Policy Towards Fragile States (2010) 
- Denmark‘s Integrated Stabilization Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas 
of the World (2013) 
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Appendix D: What is Governance? 
In its most basic form, governance (as opposed to ―good‖ governance) concerns the rule of the 
rulers, or in other words “the action, manner, or function of governing a state, organization, etc.‖ 
(Oxford Dictionary). How authority is exercised through control and management (of the state) 
is a central theme within the governance literature, wherefore governance is a key concept, when 
examining how societies are steered, as noted by Pierre & Peters: ―governance is the capacity of 
a government to make and implement policy, in other words, to steer society‖ (Pierre & Peters, 
2000:1). According to Pierre & Peters, the (state) capacity to implement and make policies is 
thus analogous to steering, wherefore state institutions, in the form of the public administration 
and the bureaucratic system, are important objects of analysis, when studying governance.  
As stated by the World Bank, governance also involves the process ―by which authority is 
conferred on rulers, by which they make the rules, and by which those rules are enforced and 
modified‖ (World Bank, 2009). By this token, governance accordingly covers a certain judicial 
aspect, and can also be coupled with state legitimacy, the rule of law and the civil sphere‘s 
acceptance of state authority (Kjær, 2004: 12). Moreover, governance also concerns what is 
called the rules of the game, which regulate and determine the capacity to steer a society; these 
not always take on the form of formal rules (i.e. legislation), but can also be informally bound 
(i.e. norms and values) (ibid: 10).  
That said, governance is used in a variety of contexts, which need not necessarily be confined to 
the government and state-level; government is but one institution involved in governance, and it 
its widest sense, governance refers to the ―various ways through which social life is coordinated‖ 
(Heywood, 2007: 6). It is thus possible to think of ―governance without government‖ (Rhodes, 
1996) 
In its most abstract form, governance revolves around how actions and processes form stable 
practices and institutions over time (Hufty, 2011). So, while there are different interpretations of 
governance, they all grow out of focus on institutions; as Kjær points out, governance is key to 
understanding, how institutions emerge and change (Kjær, 2004: 8-9). 
From an informal perspective, institutions refer to customs, norms or behavioral patterns 
important to a given society (e.g. money and marriage), while the formal aspect of institutions 
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concerns the organizations of government and the public services (e.g. parliament and the public 
administration). A broad definition of institutions refers quite simply to ―stable, valued, recurring 
patterns of behavior‖ (Huntington, 1965: 394). Governance is central to fully understand the role 
of institutions in a political setting, which mainly denotes to how the governance of institutions 
affects political behavior. Single-handedly, institutionalism tells us little about, how institutions 
are formed or altered; governance theory plays an important role to this extent, inferring how 
policy implementation, as an act of governance, alters institutions or creates new ones (Kjær, 
2004: 9).  
In summary, governance concerns both the act of governing and the processes tied to this, and it 
revolves around themes of authority, steering the society, rules of the game, state capacity and 
institutions. Moreover, it is a central term, when examining the state and its public 
administration‘s capacity in steering society, but can encompass much more than so. 
The World Bank notes, that ―governance is the institutional capacity of public organizations to 
provide the public and other goods demanded by a country‘s citizens or their representatives in 
an effective, transparent, impartial, and accountable manner‖ (World Bank, 2000: 48). 
Suggesting that a country‘s citizens have the right to demand certain goods, while the provision 
of such goods must be effective, transparent and impartial, implies that the World Bank finds 
governance to be democratically bound and a value-laden term. There is hence an ideal form of 
governance, or in other words, there is ―good‖ governance and there is ―bad‖ governance. 
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Appendix E: The Security-Development Nexus  
The link between security and development is most commonly referred to as the security-
development nexus in policy papers and by the academic community. In short, the nexus builds 
on the notion that the malaise of development, poverty and weak state capacity, are now 
interpreted, by donors and international organizations, as themes that are sources to insecurity 
(Griffith, 1993; Duffield, 2001: 37-39)
39
. To this end, it is argued that this source of insecurity, 
which threatens the Global South, originates from domestic sources, including: violent transfers 
of power, insurgency, seseccion, rebellion, genocide, warlordism, etc. The observation that 
development and security have an effect on one another and converge is not per se a new 
phenomenon (Hettne, 2010), though earlier ―none of this was carried out in the name of a nexus, 
that is, an explicit articulation of the connections between the two‖ (Stern & Öjendal, 2010: 10) 
 
Duffield (2001) gives an account of how the notion of the security-development nexus emerged, 
which he ties to the shifting nature of conflicts and the emergence of the new wars
40
 in the 
1990s. As intra-state conflicts increasingly rose during the 1990s
41
, the international community 
saw an obligation to intervene through humanitarian intervention
42
 (Bellamy, 2013: 290). The 
military dimension to these interventions, were nonetheless percieved as failures (e.g. US 
intervention in Somalia (1993), Rwandan genocide (1994)), which questioned the objective with 
                                                 
39
 The merging of security and development, from a recent policy perspective, started with the term Security Sector 
Reform (SSR), which was an expression that emerged during the 1990s in the wake of the crises in Eastern Europe. 
In policy circles, recognition arose that one of the drivers of instability, was the lacking provision of security by the 
state. Essentially SSR refers to a set of ―policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to 
improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way 
that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and 
responsive to the needs of the public.‖ (US DOD, 2009: 3). SSR and security-development nexus have in many 
ways come to encompass the same meaning, and are used interchangeably by donors, although it could be said that 
SSR to a higher degree refers to the policy papers themselves on the matter of addressing security and development 
in unison. 
40
 As famously described by Kaldor (1999), in the new wars civilian deaths are a direct aim and not an unfortunate 
consequence. A series of conflicts in the 1990s in Africa gave rise to this notion, based on the observation, that in 
extension of warlordism, genocide and ethnic cleansing civilians were directly targeted.  
41
 To this end, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program has arguably been one of the most important projects, which has 
indicated the trend of rising intrastate conflicts (http://ucdp.uu.se/).   
42
 Humanitarian intervention is a military intervention based not on strategic objectives, but rather humanitarian 
ones, usually against the will of the host government. In the gross abuse of human rights (that might also afflict 
neighboring countries), humanitarian intervention is seen as a justifiable tool. In practice, it has not always been so 
easy to reach consensus on these blurry lines, which justify the intervention.  
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these interventions as a whole. As stated by Duffield, the failure of humanitarian intervention
43
 
led to a policy shift towards conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction, rather than 
interfering with conflicts while they were ongoing (Duffield, 2001). By this token, the drivers of 
conflict needed to be addressed, where policy-makers ―came to see economic inequality, 
underdevelopment and poor governance at the root of armed conflict and crime‖ (Buur et al, 
2007: 9) 
 
Traditional development tools (e.g. agriculture, health, education), were in this case not seen as 
the main pillars, which would curb underdevelopment and conflict; rather it was the ―new‖ 
development tools of the 1990s, which were enlisted (e.g. democratization, human rights and 
good governance). This was particularly reflected by the Clinton administration‘s emphasis on 
democratic enlargement
44
 (Brinkley, 1997), which saw the spreading of democracy, human 
rights and a market economy as the only viable means to combatting the suffering and instability, 
which the internal wars in the Global South gave rise to (Jakobsen, 2014)
45
. To this end, 
adressing the security-development nexus, not only took the form of curbing poverty, but also in 
regards to aspects of lacking human rights and a deficit in democratization processes.   
 
In parallel, the broadening conceptualization of security also took place during this era, as I 
previously explained in Chapter 3 on theory. Rothstein (1986) was arguably the first to recognize 
development‘s role with regard to the shifting nature of the security complex, noting that the 
security of most states had little to do with anarchy and structural facets; rather security was tied 
to limited power capabilities, domestic order, and threat perception of small ruling elites. 
Identifying these new drivers of insecurity, Rothstein effectively coupled security with 
underdevelopment. In this sense, security is construed concerning the weakness of states, rather 
than the strength of states (i.e. a Cold War setting) (Breitenbauch, 2014: 34). Related, conflicts in 
the Global South exposed which effects internal war had on the world‘s most impoverished. This 
sparked debates regarding human security, which stressed that the proper referent for security 
                                                 
43
 In this regard, it is worth mentioning that humanitarian intervention also served as a basis for moral cause, which 
is increasingly necessary, when looking at democratic support for warfare. Garnering such a consensus is not always 
practical in conflict situations, when time is of importance - the genocide in Rwanda was for instance a case of how 
support for the intervention was garnered too late.  
44
 Commonly referred to as the Clinton Doctrine 
45
 Duffield (2001) has called this the enlistment of liberal peace as a foreign security policy.  
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should be the individual, rather than solely construing security in relation to state and military 
threats. The multi-disciplinary research on this subject, which often combined international 
development studies with security studies, saw security and development in a new light, hinting 
that the two might be more interlinked, than previously understood.    
 
Denmark and the Nexus 
The first traces we see of security and development being merged in a Danish context also 
occurred during the 1990s, for instance when former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen noted in 1991 that, ―The Golf War has demonstrated, that our security 
increasingly has a North/South dimension to it‖ (Ellemann-Jensen, 1991). The conclusion of the 
Cold War, gave rise to the belief that the international order stood on the threshold of a new 
peaceful era. But that belief came to an abrupt end in 1990, when Iraqi tanks invaded Kuwait. As 
such, the threat towards the West no longer came from the East, but from the South. The idea 
that threats could stem from the South was also exacerbated by an increased spreading, in the 
1990s, of advanced weapons and arms to the Global South (Friis Bach et al, 2008: 437). 
 
The realization that events in the world's poorest countries could threaten Denmark was not only 
new and striking, but also had the effect, that Denmark started to allude that there was a 
connection between security and development. During the 1990s, Denmark became the largest 
contributor towards international peace operations (measured per capita), which the UN 
recognized as development assistance, if the contribution took place in a developing country 
(Holm, 2002: 28). Moreover, the Danish military budget was increased from 14 billion DKK 
(1988) to 15.5 billion DKK (1997) (Fischer, 1997: 118), while the Danish Defense Commission 
acknowledged in 1998, that several non-military factors posed security concerns (migration, 
catastrophes, pollution and international crime) (Danish Defense Commission, 1998: 68-71). 
Other examples, of how Denmark started to couple security and development during this period, 
included: supporting Benin and Burkina Faso‘s deployment of peace keeping missions in Liberia 
with development funds; support to a regional institute in Zimbabwe to train peace keeping units 
deployable in Southern Africa; supporting the de-armament program of Nicaragua, post the 
country‘s civil war; the attempt to use Danish aid funds to purchase arms from conflict zones for 
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destruction; and the purchase of armored vehicles for Danida advisors in Gaza (Friis Bach et al, 
2008: 436-440).  
 
Moreover, since the 1990s there has also been an attempt to combine Danish civil-military 
efforts. Given Denmark‘s limited resources in a foreign political context, it became evident, that 
combining the civil and military dimensions, would enhance capabilities in reaching her foreign 
political objectives. When military force came to play a central role in efforts to promote peace 
and democracy, it was above all tied to the Soviet Union's collapse, which created a situation 
where conventional military threats were absent. In the 1990s a clear division of labor between 
military and civilian organizations was laid out. The military would provide security for the 
civilian actors, so they had the necessary leeway to build infrastructure, create economic growth, 
rule of law, democracy, good governance and reconciliation. Moreover, the military set up 
during this period a special unit task-force for civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) to carry out 
cooperation with civilian actors. CIMIC was viewed by the military as a useful instrument, 
which could be used to increase their own protection (force protection), create goodwill among 
the local population and to gather intelligence. The civil organizations also saw advantages with 
this system, which from their standpoint, was perceived as an opportunity to draw on the 
military's superior logistical resources (Jakobsen, 2014). 
 
It was already clear in the 1990s that this division of labor did not always work in practice, 
which in large part was due to the civil actors not having sufficient capacity, why the military 
was increasingly imposed to carry out civilian tasks, which they had no desire or power to solve. 
The lack of civilian capacities in law and order and civil administration was a recurring problem, 
and it was particularly glaring in Kosovo, where NATO had to act as local administrators and 
maintain law and order in the first year, because the UN could not provide the necessary police 
officers, judges, prison guards and administrators. 
 
The Danish international peacekeeping contribution to the UN-mission in Yugoslavia was the 
first time in recent Danish foreign political history when Danish soldier engaged in actual battle; 
also known as ‗Operation Bøllebank‘ in 1993.  Since then, the Danish Defense has had to learn 
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the hard way, that the Danish military effort is just one instrument in the Danish foreign political 
tool-box to achieve a political objective. As noted by Breitenbauch (2014),  
 
―The paradox with Danish international utility of force, since the Cold War, is: that the 
Danish Defense, with good reasons, has had to relearn how to use military force in 
complex military operations, while the same complex military operations are deeply 
political in purpose and function‖.  
 
Combining military and civil practices is difficult in praxis, mainly because the two entities have, 
in a Danish context at least, been used to operating in silos and according to their own 
institutional configurations and purposes. The military abides to a completely different set of 
rules, and essentially the two entities have different interpretations of what constitutes ―success‖. 
To say the least, it has been a slow work, which is still in progress, for the Danish foreign 
political tools of the military and the civilian capacities to merge.   
 
The joint planning and coordination of military and civilian Danish efforts for stabilization has 
been a key theme for the Danish international operations since 2004, not least with regard to 
Afghanistan. The EU, the UN, Britain and other players were already in the process of 
coordinating their efforts and instruments in relation to fragile states and armed conflict before 
September 11. Nonetheless, the coordinated effort - which emerged in response to strategic and 
logistical issues in Iraq and Afghanistan - was nothing radically new, but a further development 
of the experiences made in the 1990s (Jakobsen, 2014).  
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Appendix F: Fragile States 
The causes and symptoms of ineffective states vary; hence state fragility is characterized by 
multiple aspects, but it is suggested by Torres & Anderson (2004: 5-6) that the features include 
the following: state collapse, loss of territorial control, low administrative capacity, political 
instability, neo-patrimonial politics, conflict and repressive politics  
Lemay-Hébert (2011) notes that one dominant school of thought has influenced this field, 
namely one which revolves around the Weberian ideal of state institutions and the notion of the 
state‘s monopoly on violence. Thomas (1987) was arguably one of the pioneering scholars to 
underscore that state weakness is associated with these Weberian founded aspects, highlighting 
the importance despotic power, which concerns a state‘s coercive abilities, and infrastructural 
power which refers to the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions.  
When it comes to the institutional dimension of state-failure, Rotberg (2003) has arguably been 
the most prominent contemporary scholar with this academic field, he notes that ―it is according 
to their performances—according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial 
political goods—that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from 
failed or collapsed‖ (Rotberg, 2003). Rotberg thus finds that state failure stems directly from the 
state‘s lacking ability to provide public goods (Rotberg, 2002: 85). This implies that state 
fragility also concerns low administrative capacity, in the form of being unable to implement 
policies simply due to the lack of resources, staff, and administrative systems (Torres & 
Anderson, 2004: 5). Such conditions are exacerbated under circumstances where administrative 
systems are dominated by neo-patrimonial politics and extractive institutional setups; to this end, 
the state institutions may be unable to project sufficient administrative capacity to carry out even 
basic state functions (van de Walle, 2001; Bayart et al, 1998). In essence, the emphasis on 
clientelism and lacking institutional capacity, feeds into North‘s notion of limited access order 
societies (Section  4.3), which are characterized by a political stability founded upon the 
brokering between the ruling elites. 
Moreover, under circumstances, where the public administration effectively has collapsed, and 
no longer has the ability fulfill its basic duties, state legitimacy is vulnerable and can be 
contested (Rotberg, 2002: 87).  This touches upon the notion of the Weberian ideal, that a state 
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must have a secure monopoly on violence, which defines its sovereignty. As such, the state‘s 
legitimate use of physical force has to be executed with retention (coercive capacity). If such a 
monopoly is not present, other factions (e.g. in the form of terrorist organizations) will be able to 
contest state authority (Rotberg, 2014)
46
. 
  
                                                 
46
 To this end, it has been cornerstone for the Danish engagement for instance in Afghanistan to build a coercive 
capacity, through the capacity building of the Afghan military and police forces (UM, 2008). 
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Appendix G: COIN 
Counter-insurgency is one of the primary strategic and tactical concerns, when operating as an 
intervening foreign force in a milieu with guerilla warfare. Insurgency has been an issue, which 
foreign military forces long have had to deal with (e.g. British Empire‘s campaign in Malaya 
(1950); Dutch Empire‘s Campaign in the East Indies (1947); the French colonies in Indochina, 
West Africa and Algeria post-WWII). Nonetheless, it was also a major concern with regards to 
the intervention in Afghanistan, where the fight against the Taliban bore COIN traits. The US 
defines COIN as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and 
contain insurgency and address its root causes" (U.S. Army, 2009).  
 
The manuals of COIN divide the task into several phases. The first phases are characterized by 
offensive military operation for dealing with the insurgents in conflict zones. When stability is 
founded, the focus shifts towards the stabilization tasks and population-centered COIN. During 
this phase, the focus is to ―win the hearts and minds‖ of the indigenous population to gain trust, 
legitimacy and authority. COIN manuals have increasingly begun stressing the importance of 
strengthening the capacity of indigenous actors and the local government, since they will be 
viewed as more credible and legitimate in the population. Good governance plays a vital role to 
this extent, as one of the primary ways of establishing an institutional and state legitimacy 
(RAND, 2008: 78) 
 
Governance is actually one of the primary concerns for the military counter-insurgency forces. 
However, this poses a challenge for the military because it increasingly has to think about non-
military concerns. The military‘s deficit in knowledge and expertise with these ―softer‖ 
dimensions of COIN is one of the main reasons why a combination of the civil military efforts 
has been necessary in conflict and instable zones.  
 
 
 
 
